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n the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America

CHAIRMAN'S OPINION

Case #M-318-89

and
American Airlines

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Evelis Brandon? If not, what should be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 18, 1990 at which time Mr.
Brandon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

Ms.

Judith A. Shire and Mr. Anthony J. Gaudioso served, respectively,
as the Company and Union members of the Board of Adjustment, and
the Undersigned served as Chairman. The Oath of the Board was
waived. A stenographic record of the hearing was taken. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Board
met in executive session on July 10, 1990.
The evidentiary Question is whether the Company has met its
burden of proof by showing, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the grievant committed an unprovoked assault on Crew Chief
Frank DiMarco by grabbing DiMarco, pushing him back into another
piece of equipment and punching him in the lip.
DiMarco's testimony supports the charge. He asserts that
he was giving the grievant routine instructions for unloading a
plane's baggage, when the grievant first yelled and screamed at
him, said "let's go" (which DiMarco interpreted to mean that the
grievant wanted to fight); and then after parking his tractor,
got off it and came at him, grabbed his shirt near the neck and
throat and pushed him backwards against a stationary cochran.
And that after they were separated, DiMarco felt a blow to his

- 2 .ip, which because the grievant was the one in close proximity,
e believes the grievant inflicted.

There is no dispute that

iMarco suffered a cut or bruised lip.
Admitting he "grabbed" DiMarco, the grievant denies he
truck him on the lip.

He asserts that DiMarco insulted him and

revoked him to anger by calling him "dick" and "dickhead" as
iMarco gave orders for the plane's unloading.
In determining what happened, I do not consider the testiiony of Raven Chaney to be reliable.

Nor do I consider the testi-

iony of Ralston Headley to be accurate or complete.

The testimony

f the other witnesses, either because they did not see the inident or did not see it in its entirety, cannot be determinaive.

Chaney was ostensibly a fleet service clerk, but in

•eality, he was an undercover agent investigating drug trafficng and/or use among employees.

His first written report of the

.Itercation between the grievant and. DiMarco was false, by his
wn admission.

That report did not fix responsibility for the

.Itercation nor support the elements of the charge.

His second

•eport (provided to the investigation firm) was written after he
•eturned home from his shift on May 19, 1989.

It, along with

.is testimony, support, the charges against Brandon.

Chaney's

explanation for his first, "false" report, was that he didn't
'ant to prejudice his position among the employees or presumably
blow his cover".

It should be noted, significantly, that Chaney

•eported that the grievant struck DiMarco on the lip with two
ilows at two different times.

Yet DiMarco reports only one blow.

;o, in short, I am uneasy with Chaney's testimony, and as it is
.he only direct evidence linking the grievant to DiMarco's lip
.njury, I cannot accept it as the critical testimony which would
lUpport all the elements of the charge and hence be the basis
:or

upholding the discharge.
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Itercation.

He broke up the

I think he knows more about the blow to DiMarco's

ip than he acknowledges.

He denies that he saw the grievant do

t, advancing instead the possibility that he (Headley) may have
ccidently struck DiMarco on the lip when he separated the two
en.

That testimony is not convincing.

His description of how

e separated them (and the traditional methods of doing so) do
ot lend themselves to the probability of an accidental blow to
he lip.

Had he bruised DiMarco's lip while separating the two

en, I am convinced that he and DiMarco would have known it and
eacted differently.
This is not a criminal case.
riminal standards of proof apply.

Here, the civil, rather than
Circumstantial evidence,

ogic and reasonable conclusions are adequate in disciplinary
ases, to meet the standard of clear and convincing.

Therefore,

he case narrows to the testimonies of the grievant and DiMarco.
oth have something to gain from picturing themselves in the
est light.

The grievant seeks to overturn his discharge.

'iMarco seeks to be viewed as an innocent victim, who did not
revoke the confrontation.
Based on their respective testimonies, the other circumstantial evidence and rational analysis, I have concluded that
the following happened.

The grievant did advance on DiMarco;

iid exhibit anger towards him; did grab him and push him backwards; and, because there was motive and compelling probability,
d hit DiMarco on the lip.

But, again, logic, circumstances

and rationality lead me to disbelieve that this occurred only
oecause DiMarco ordered the grievant to first remove empty
artons from the plane (and place them on the ground) and then
unload the baggage.

And/or that it occurred because DiMarco

ailed the grievant or got his attention with the word or sound
yo."

There is no evidence of earlier "bad blood" between them

or earlier confrontations.

There had to be something more to

ause the grievant to first show anger by language; then to park
lis tractor and return to confront and grab DiMarco.

That some-

thing had to be provocative - in the nature of a real or
perceived insult.

Indeed, the events do not hold together and

annot be adequately explained without it.

Consequently, I

onclude that the grievant may very well be telling the truth
he claims that DiMarco, in giving unloading orders, called
a "dick" and "dick-head."
In that setting where the grievant, improperly I believe,
resented and even resisted removing empty cartons before the
saggage, the appellation "dick" or "dick-head" is insulting and
provocative and could well trigger a physical assault.

That the

grievant did not make this claim as defense at his unemployment
insurance hearing is troublesome.
rent than an arbitration.

Yet, that proceeding is diff-

I do not know if the grievant and his

representative knew or thought that his unemployment claim would
contested by the Company and therefore what magnitude of
defense was necessary.
However, on balance, and in short, the Unemployment
Insurance case notwithstanding, I am persuaded that there had
to be some triggering event to set the grievant off to attack
DiMarco, and my conclusion in that regard and the evidence
supporting it in this record simply preempts the omission from
the Unemployment Insurance record.
Of course, this is not to excuse the grievant.

He should

have carried out DiMarco ' s orders without resistance or
omplaint .

Had he done so the event might not have taken place.

And even if or when called an insulting name, his proper
response was to do the job as ordered and complain to his Union
about DiMarco ' s name calling.

At best, the provocation is
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therefore only a mitigating factor.
warranted.

Discipline is clearly

The assault was serious and dangerous.

Even after

separated the grievant continued the attack with a blow to
DiMarco's lip.

This type of response and conduct cannot be

tolerated, especially when alternative remedies are available
through Union representation and the grievance procedure.

But,

under the particular circumstances of this case, discipline
hort of discharge is warranted and appropriate.

The discharge

hall be reduced to a disciplinary suspension for the period
of time the grievant has been out.

I find no significance to

and therefore reject the Union's claim that the Company relied
on the wrong work rule in effectuating discipline.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED:

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America

AWARD
Case #M-318-89

and
American Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Adjustment,
i and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the aboveI named parties, make the following AWARD:
I
The discharge of Evelis Brandon is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be
reinstated, but without back pay.

i

DATED: July 23, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990
)ss .
)

DATED: July
1990
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF
)

Anthony J. Gaudioso
C9ncurring
Dissenting

Judith A. Shire
Concurring
Dissenting

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America, Local 501, AFL-CIO

.
„
J? ~ c
Grievance No. S-Q5-

r

and
American Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
Vincent Goldring.

DATED: June 7, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) °"

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Mary B. Fives
Concurring

I, Mary B. Fives do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Anthony J. Gaudioso
Dissenting

I, Anthony J. Gaudioso do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport W-orkers Union
of America, Local 501, AFL-CIO

CHAIRMAN
Grievance No. S-Q5-88
OPINION OF

and
American Airlines, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Vincent Goldring? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 14, 1988 at which time Mr.
Goldring, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Ms. Mary

B. Fives served as the Company's designee on the Board of Arbitration and Mr. Anthony J. Gaudioso served as the Union's designee.

The Undersigned was selected as the Chairman.

The Oath

of the Board of Arbitration was waived; a stenographic record
of the hearing was taken, and subsequently, the Board met in
executive session on May 17, 1989.
On December 2, 1987. while attempting to travel with his
family from San Juan to St. Thomas on an American Eagle flight
using his employee pass,

the grievant, a store's clerk is

accused of physically assaulting Vanessa Riollano, an American
Eagle supervisor who was working the American Eagle departure
gate.

An assault of the type alleged is in direct violation of

Company Rules applicable to travel on an employee pass and there
is no serious dispute that it would be grounds for discharge if
proved and if unexcused.
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The critical questions in this case are whether the grievant who had worked for the Company for only about three years,
committed the assault as charged, and if so, whether he should
be excused or the discharge penalty mitigated because he was
provoked by Riollano.
I accept as accurate and credible the testimony of Riollano
and other testimony by Company witnesses that despite his denial,
the grievant committed the assault.

I find as a matter of fact

that, angry and frustrated because there was no room for him and
his family (though there was room on the final flight that day
for his family) on the flights to St. Thomas, the grievant hit or
pushed Riollano in the chest, causing her to fall to the floor,
and then, when she ran, pursued her, caught her, and pushed or
threw her into a glass wall partition.
The Company's Regulation N.5 provides among other penalties,
for "dismissal from the Company for:
5. Misconduct while using travel privileges."
I find that to be a reasonable rule.
American Eagle is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company,
and Company employee travel privileges are applicable to American
Eagle flights.

Hence "Misconduct" in connection with an American

Eagle flight is a violation of that Regulation.
It is clear that the grievant knew the limitations of his
travel privileges.

The principal limitation is that he and his

family can be accommodated on a flight as non-revenue
only if there is space for them.

passengers

If the flight is full with

regular revenue passengers, the employee (and his family) cannot
claim seats and cannot be boarded.
That is what happened in San Juan.

After flying from New

York to San Juan, the connecting flights from San Juan to St. Thomas
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were all full with revenue passengers.

Each time the grievant

was told by American Eagle and particularly by Riollano that a
particular flight was full, (or as in one case, became full when
there was an equipment change to a smaller aircraft) the grievant
became increasingly angry.

When he was denied boarding on the

last flight to St. Thomas (though there was room for his family
and they were initially boarded) he remonstrated with Riollano,
and angrily and rhetorically asked her whether it meant that he
"had to stay in San Juan."

It is undisputed that Riollano replied

"Yes, unless you want to go swimming."

The grievant's assault on

Riollano followed.
The remaining question is whether Riollano's response, which
she admits was wrong on her part, and which was at least impolite,
if not provocative, was so provocative as to excuse the grievant's
assault that followed.

I conclude it was not.

Travelling on pass privileges, the grievant knew or should
have known that there was a risk that all the flights could be
filled with revenue passengers.

The possibility that he could be

stranded at any location was or should have been well within his
contemplation.

There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that

American Eagle planned not to board him, or willfully created a
situation designed to deny him the travel accommodations.

So

while his frustration is understandable, there is no excuse for
his anger and certainly no excuse to blame American Eagle or its
personnel for his predicament.

His attitude each time he was told

there was no room was one of anger, and uncooperativeness, including his use of insulting and disparaging words about American
Eagle Airlines.

That attitude was uncalled for and inconsistent

with the known limitations and risks he ran when travelling on
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his employee pass.
If Riollano's remark that it appeared he was stuck in San
Juan, "unless he wanted to go swimming" was provocative and may
have set off the assault, she had been previously provoked by
his angry complaints about not being boarded.,, and by his profane
and insulting words about her airline (which he made to his wife
and she to him, but within Riollano's hearing, and obviously intended for her ears).

In short, she was fed up with his attitude

and conduct, and though she should not have passed the remark
about "swimming" and should have restrained her own anger she
was first provoked by the grievant, by his unjustified complaints
and uncooperativeness when he could not be boarded.

Therefore,

I find that the grievant was responsible for creating the atmosphere and circumstance that led to the remark about swimming.
And that if the assault might not have occurred but for that remark, that remark would not have occurred but for the grievant's
objectionable and insulting attitude.

Therefore I cannot find

that the grievant should be excused from the consequences of his
assault on Riollano.
Moreover, the assault was actually two assaults.

The first,

when he hit or pushed her in the chest, and later when he chased
her and pushed or threw her into the wall.

If, arguendo, there

is any excusable basis for the first, there is none for the second.
Assuming that the first was spontaneous, uncontrollable physical
reaction from anger and frustration, it should have ended there.
The grievant had time to realize what he had done.
have stopped the attack.

He should

Enough time had passed for him to back

off, help Riollano from the ground, and apologize for his loss of
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control.

There was time for him to recognize his error, and to

attempt to limit its severity.

But he did not.

As she ran away,

instead of restraining himself then as I believe he could and
should have done, he chased her.

And when he caught her, again

instead of restraining himself, he committed the second assault
by thrusting her into the wall.

That second assault, even under

a scenario most favorable to the grievant, compounded and aggravated his mistakes, and nullifies any consideration of justification or mitigation.
Accordingly, the discharge of the grievant, a relatively
short service employee, is upheld.

DATED: June 7, 1989

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
Local 514

AWARD

and
American Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of R. Mobley for violation
of Regulation 34 of the American Airlines
Rules and Regulations, is upheld.

DATED: May 8, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)88

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

Michael Costell
Concurring
DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

I,,Michael Costello do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Gary Drummon
Dissenting
DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

1, Gary Drummon do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
Local 514

OPINION

of
NEUTRAL REFEREE

and

American Airlines, Inc

The stipulated issue is:
This dispute is hereby submitted to the
System Board of Adjustment, American
Airlines, Inc., pursuant to Article 32
of the Agreement covering Airline Mechanics,
Plant Maintenance, Fleet Service and Ground
Service employees for determination by the
Board.
The name of the employee involved is R.
Mobley, BNA.
An attempt has been made to obtain an adjustment of the dispute in the manner provided
for in Article 31 of the Agreement and that
the parties have failed in such manner to
reach a satisfactory adjustment.
This dispute was brought about as a result
of the Company terminating the employment
of the Grievant for alleged violation of
American Airlines Rules and Regulations,
Rule 34.
The Union contends this action is unjust and
unwarranted.
Therefore, we request the Board
grant the claim of the grievant to the extent
requested.
A hearing was held in Nashville, Tennessee on April 18,
1989 at which time Mr. Mobley hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
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Mr. Gary Drummond served as the Union's member of the
System Board of Adjustment.

Mr. Michael Costello served as the

Company's member on said Board, and the Undersigned was selected
as the Neutral Referee.

The Board's Oath was waived, and a

stenographic record of the hearing was taken.

The Board met in

executive session following the hearing.
The grievant was discharge for violation of Regulation 34
of the Company's Regulations, the pertinent part of which reads:
"...Any action constituting a criminal
offense, whether committed on duty or
off duty, will be grounds for dismissal."
It is undisputed that the grievant entered a plea of guilty
in the District Court for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, to the charge
of unlawful cultivation of marijuana.
in Oklahoma.

That offense is a felony

It is not disputed that the guilty plea constitutes

a conviction of that criminal offense.
The Union does not challenge the propriety or validity of
Company Regulation 34.

Instead, it contends that the Regulation

was misapplied in this case.

It asserts that for a criminal

offense committed off duty to be grounds for discharge, the Company
must show that its reputation and/or business was damaged or that
the conviction was well enough known to the public to cause those
potential damages to the Company.

It asserts here that no such

damage or potential damage resulted.

Additionally, the Union

recognizes that discharge might be proper if the employee committed a crime that caused his fellow employees to refuse to work
with him.

But, points out the Union, there is no proof of any

such problem in this case.

Finally it contends that Regulation

34 was designed more to punish for theft and other serious work
place offenses, than for off duty crimes, and has submitted a
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number of arbitration decisions in which discharges for off duty
crimes were reversed by arbitrators because the foregoing conditions were not shown.
The language of Regulation #34 does not make any of the
distinctions raised by the Union.

Rather, clearly and unequiv-

ocally it provides for dismissal for criminal offenses whether on
duty or off duty.

Nor does it provide for consideration of the

impact on the Company's business, reputation, or the willingness
or unwillingness of other employees to work with the offender.
Nor does it make any distinctions between theft or any other
criminal offenses
It seems to me that these distinctions were well within the
parties contemplation when Regulation 34 was promulgated.

And had

there been the intent to provide for those distinctions, the Regualtions could and should have said so. And if unilaterally promulgated by the Company, the Union should have grieved its meaning and interpretion at the outset.

The arbitration cases cited

by the Union in which arbitrators recognized these distinctions
and reversed discharges

are matched by arbitration cases sub-

mitted by the Company in which the arbitrators upheld the discharges.

So, I cannot find that by arbitral decision, the dis-

tinctions relied on by the Union are an implied part of Regulation
34.

Thus the plain language of Regulation 34 stands as written

without implied conditions or variations.

And it is to the clear

language of the contract and rules of conduct promulgated thereunder that the arbitrator is bound.
The Union is correct in stating that generally (in the absence of this unconditional Regulation) off duty offenses may not
be grounds for discharge unless it is shown that the employer has
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been damaged in reputation or business.

But even if applicable

here, that would not be sufficient to reverse the discharge, because the Union has overlooked one other factor in that circumstance .
It is well settled that the nature of off duty offense which
has a reasonable relationship to the employee's job, and which
reflects on the employer's ability or reliability on the job, is
also grounds for discharge.

Thus, for example, employees with

jobs involving handling money or confidential information, or
those with police or security functions, may be dismissed for off
duty offenses or crimes of moral turpitude.
Here, the grievant is an airplane mechanic.
cultivated marijuana.
1986."

He grew and

He admits that he used marijuana"until

The relationship between possession and use of marijuana

and the duties of an airline mechanic is one of incompatibility.
The grievant asserts that he didn't use the marijuana he grew.
He says he grew it " just to see how it grew."

That explanation

is not believable, especially since drying marijuana was also
found in his house along with smoking paraphernalia.

Though there

is no direct evidence that the grievant used the marijuana, in view
of his admitted past use and the other incriminating evidence of
use, I cannot fault the Company from refusing to

run the risks

involved in keeping the grievant employed in what manifestly is
a job requiring utmost care and competence, in the interest of
safety.
So, even applying the Union's theories, the grievant's off
duty conduct and conviction are so related to the essentials of
his job and so clearly place in question the clarity of mind and
the sharpeness of reflexes required of an airline mechanic, as to
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warrant his dismissal, even if Regulation 34 was not conclusive.
Now that I have upheld the propriety and enforceability of
Regulation 34 in this proceeding, and have upheld the grievant's
discharge, I wish to make a recommendation

which in no way changes

the Award, but which I leave to the Company to consider on a
voluntary basis.
The grievant is a young man who has made a mistake.

I be-

lieve him when he says that he did not know that growing marijuana
was a felony in Oklahoma.
habilitatable.

I believe he is contrite and is re-

I am not sure that his future employability should

be so prejudiced by his discharge.

Therefore I suggest that the

Company consider reemploying him in some job less sensitive than
that of mechanic, where safety of the aircraft is not a factor.

I

am sure that if that is done, he will have to be downgraded, probably to some starting job with routine duties.

He should be given

a chance to show, by drug testing or otherwise that he is a nonuser or free of use, and after the passage of some time, to be
decided by the Company, he may again at the sole option of the
Company become eligible for return to the mechanic classification
or some comparable job for which he is qualified.

Eric J . S c h m e r t z
Neutral Referee
DATE:

May 8, 1989

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Arlington Teachers Association
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #19 39 0227 87

Arlington Central School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Article VIII F
and H of the Agreement in denying the
grievant, Marcia Smith, her request with
regard to a physical education assignment
at the Arlington High School north campus
for the 1987-1988 school year? If so, what
shall be the remedy under the Agreement?
A hearing was held on March 21, 1989 at the offices of
the District, at which time Ms. Smith, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant," and representatives of the District
Association appeared.

and the

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

While the grievant was working as a physical education
teacher at the Arlington High School south campus, a vacancy in
a position as a physical education teacher at the Arlington High
School north campus occurred.

The vacancy was posted, and the

grievant requested that she be chosen to fill the vacancy, which,
if granted, would have resulted in her move from the High School's
south campus to its north campus.
The District denied her request on the three grounds.
First, that though she was fully certified and qualified as a
physical education teacher, the north campus job also contemplated
teaching a section in health education, and she was not certified
to teach health.

Second, if her request was granted, another
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teacher, probably from the south campus would have to travel between the campuses to teach the health section that the grievant
was not certified to handle and that that would "conflict with
instructional

requirements and the best interests of the school

system" within the meaning of Article VIII F of the Agreement.
And third, that pursuant to rulings in a prior arbitration case,
the grievant had no contractual right to request the change in
teaching locale because teaching physical education on either or
both campuses is or are synonymous assignments, and to move from
one location to another would not be a "transfer" nor an available
"vacancy" within the meaning of Article VIII E, F, G of the
Agreement.
The prior arbitration award notwithstanding, I do not
agree with the District's argument.
Section f of Article VIII reads:
Consideration of Requests for Transfer
In the consideration of requests for
voluntary reassignment and/or transfer,
the wishes of the individual teacher
shall be honored to the extent that they
do not conflict with the instructional
requirements and best interests of the
school system.
The "requests for voluntary reassignment and/or transfer"
referred to therein, obviously

refer, in part at least, to Section

E Requests for Transfer, which reads:
Teachers desiring a change in grade,
subject or assignment, or transfer to
another building, or promotion to any
position for which a vacancy has not
been advertised, shall file a written
statement of such desire by letter to
the Superintendent and to the involved
principals.
The District has stipulated that the grievant had shown
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a "proper interest" in the vacancy.

That means to me, that she

made her request for the north campus job within the procedures
of Section E.
It is also stipulated that the grievant had greater seniori

ity than the person hireato fill the vacancy and also had greater
experience teaching at the high school level.

There is no evi-

dence that the grievant was unwilling to assume voluntary

respons-

ibility of coaching, if requested.
Frankly, I fail to see how the District, or a prior arbitrator could not view the grievant's request at least as a "transfer to another building" (i.e. from the south campus to the north
campus) within the meaning of Section E.

And I fail to see how

it would not be so, even if the two differently located campuses
are part of the same high school.

So I reject the District's

argument that the grievant had no contractual right to bid on or
request assignment to this vacancy.
With that finding, Sections F and G come into play.

In

view of the grievant's greater experienced at the high school level;
her certification as a physical education teacher and the absence
of any evidence that she would not coach (though that is not contractually material since coaching is purely voluntary), the question narrows to whether her rejection because she was not certified to teach health courses, was proper.
I do not accept that explanation as justification for at
least two reasons. First, I conclude that the requirement to
teach health by the appointee to the north campus vacancy was
essentially an after thought to justify the hiring of someone other
than the grievant.

The job vacancy was posted three times, on

March 10, March 30 and May 15, 1987.

All three postings were the
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same.

They noticed a "staff need" in "physical education" at

the "High School."

At no time did the posting note or require

certification in health courses, or even that teaching a health
course would be part of the job.

Therefore, the grievant had the

right to reasonably expect that the job vacancy was limited to
teaching physical education, for which she was fully qualified.
Indeed, as it turned out, the person hired taught a
health course for only a few weeks after the school year began,
and thereafter was confined to physical education.

So, I am not

convinced that the health course assignment was an important or
even planned activity for the person chosen to fill the vacancy,
or a qualifying condition that should have barred the grievant
from being selected.
Second, for that reason, and based on practices disclosed
at the hearings, I am not persuaded that a "conflict with the instructional requirement" or with the "best interests of the school
system" would result if one section of health education at the
north campus was taught by a teacher who had to travel to that
campus from elsewhere.

The record discloses that regularly in

other years teachers have "commuted" between campuses to teach
health and home economic courses, and to coach.
In short, while it would be more convenient for the physical education teacher located at the north campus to teach health
courses, if needed, any such assignment by a physical education
teacher traveling from elsewhere to the north campus is consistent
with the district's practices, and therefore does not rise to the
level of a "conflict with the instructional requirements" or to
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the level of being contrary to the "best interest of the school
system," within the meaning and intent of Section F.
The same is true, in my view, for the District's assertion that any such arrangement would have caused the loss of onehalf a period of "supervisory time."
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The District violated Article VIII F and
H of the Agreement in denying the grievant, Marcia Smith, her request with regard
to a physical education assignment at the
Arlington High School north campus for the
1987-1988 school year. She shall be given
that physical education assignment at the
north campus in the 1989-1990 school year,
if the assignment still exists then.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 5, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
BOCES Staff Association
and
Board of Cooperative Educational
Services of Rockland County

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #19 39 0253 87

The stipulated issue is:
Is the compensation of the grievants in
the grievance filed on October 6, 1987
in violation of Article IV A, Article
XXVIII, and Appendix B of the current
agreement between Rockland BOCES and the
BOCES Staff Association? If so what shall
the remedy be?
Hearings were held on May 23, 1988, February 6 and 28th,
1989 at which time representatives of the above-named Association
and Board appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs and reply briefs.
As I see it, the central question is whether the directive of the Rockland County Department of Personnel, effective
September 1, 1987 reclassifying the Teacher Aide positions in the
BOCES of Rockland County to Teaching Assistant positions carried
with it an upgrading in salary under the collective bargaining
agreement for the reclassified Aides from the Aides salary schedule to the Teaching Assistant salary schedule.
In the adjudicatory process, whether in arbitration, in
court, or before administrative agencies, it is not infrequent
that "things may appear to be within the letter of the law, but
not within its intent or purpose."
I conclude that that is what is present in the instant
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case.

It would appear that when the Teacher Aides were found to

be Teaching Assistants by the Department of Personnel, they would
be entitled to pay as Teaching Assistants.

But, upon careful re-

view of the record before me, I find that the Personnel Department,
and the State Education Department did not intend or order that
result, and that the facts adduced herein do not support that result under the collective bargaining

agreement.

In short, I find that the Personnel Department, as affirmed by the State Education Department ruled that the Teacher Aides
should be Teaching Assistants within the meaning of the

Education

Law and Commissioner's Regulations, but that that ruling did not
mean that the reclassified Aides had become Teaching Assistants,
substantively, under the collective bargaining agreement for pay
purposes.
Prior to the reclassification ruling, there were two relevant classifications in the BOCES bargaining unit and covered by
the collective agreement - Teaching Assistants and Teacher Aides.
Each had a separate and different salary schedule (Appendix B and
Appendix C respectively).

After the ruling the Board technically

reclassified the aides as Teaching Assistants, and accorded them
the rights and benefits of that classification under the Education
Law and Commissioner's Regulations.
However, the Board did not change their salary schedule;
did not change their duties; and, to "avoid confusion" with the
prior incumbent teaching assistants

gave them an "internal title"

of "Teaching Assistant/Teacher Aide."
Absent a bilaterally negotiated agreement between the
parties, I am persuaded that the reclassified Aides would be entitled to the higher contractual salary schedule of Teaching

-3Assistant if that was ordered by operation of law or if the duties
of the Aides had so significantly changed since their salary sched
ule was last contractually negotiated as to bring them to the substantive level of Teaching Assistants under the contract.

These

conditions or circumstances are not present in the instant case.
The reclassification order of the Department of Personnel
does not deal with salaries, makes no comparisons between the reclassified Aides and the then incumbent Teaching Assistants, and
indeed, makes no reference to the collective bargaining agreement
or to the two different salary schedules therein.

Its audit

"revealed that the incumbents of all these
positions (i.e. the Teacher Aides) have
been providing direct instructional services to students; most for greater than
half of their workday. Such instructional
services include but are not limited to
working one-on-one with students in the reinforcement of education such as reading,
math, sign language, etc."
That finding brought the Aides within the definition of
Teaching Assistant under the Education Law and Commissioner's
Regulations and within the jurisdiction of the Board of Education.
That Description, with Duties reads:
[1] Description: A teaching assistant appointed
by a board of education to provide under the
general supervision of a licensed or certified teacher, direct instruction service to
students.
[2] Duties: Teaching assistants assist teachers
by performing duties such as:
(i) working with individual pupils or
groups of pupils on special instructional projects;
(ii) providing the teacher with information about pupils which will assist the
teacher in the development of appropriate
learning experiences;
(iii) assisting pupils in the use of available instruction resources, and assisting
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in the development of instruction materials;
(iv) utilizing their own special skills
and abilities by assisting in instructional programs in such areas as: foreign
languages, arts, crafts, music, and similar
subjects; and
(v) assisting in related instructional work
as required.
What is significant, I believe, is that the duties which
the Department of Personnel observed and which were the subject
of its audit, were essentially the same duties which the Aides
were performing when the current collective agreement was negotiated in 1986 and were the same duties for which the parties had
agreed on a particular salary schedule.

In other words, whether

as Aides, or thereafter reclassified as Teaching Assistants, the
pay schedule negotiated was applicable to and reflective of a set
of duties and responsibilities that had not changed since they
were evaluated for pay purposes.

And that that salary schedule

evaluated those duties and responsibilities different from and at
a lesser rate than the salary schedule of the prior incumbent
Teaching Assistants.
I am satisfied that as the salary schedule for Aides was
bilaterally agreed to in contract negotiations; was adequate for
the duties and responsibilities then required of the Aides, and
in the absence of any significant changes and increases in those
duties and responsibilities, that salary schedule must continue
to obtain, regardless of the educational law reclassification by
the Department of Personnel.

Again, neither the reclassification

ruling nor the facts of this case point to a different conclusion.
Nor do they probatively accord professional parity between the
former Aides and the incumbent Teaching Assistants.
Indeed, the decision of the Commissioner of Education of
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the State Education Department of April 29, 1988 is both instructive and supportive of this finding.

The decision was in response

to the Association's appeal to the Commissioner requesting that
the Board be directed to
"amend the appointments to reflect the reclassification as Teaching Assistants,
with placement on the salary schedule for
Teaching Assistants and all other contractual benefits ..."
In rejecting the Association's complaint over the "hybrid"
term "Teaching Assistant/Teacher Aide" and its complaint

regard-

ing the Board's failure to increase the former aide's salaries,
the Commissioner said, in pertinent part:
"In light of respondent's recognition that
petitioners serve solely in the Teaching
Assistant tenure area and its assertion
that its designation of their positions as
Teaching Assistant/Teacher Aides for contract
interpretation purposes does not alter the
fact that they serve solely in the unclassified
service, that part of petitioners appeal which
contends that respondent has improperly attempted
to create a hybrid position in both the classified and unclassified service must be dismissed
as academic." (emphasis added) and,
"Both this appeal and the grievance filed by
the BOCES Staff Association request that respondent pay petitioners pursuant to the salary schedule for Teaching Assistants contained
in the collective bargaining agreement. It
must be noted that petitioners do not allege
that their Union has failed in its duty of fair
representation in this matter
Under such circumstances the petitioners request that respondent
be ordered to apply to them the contract terms
concerning Teaching Assistants must be dismissed."
(emphasis added)
It is clear to me that the references to the "tenure area"
and "the unclassified service" and to the absence of an allegation
of a failure of the "duty of fair representation" and the dismissal of the Association's request for application of the contract
benefits, mean that the ruling of the Department of Personnel and
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the appeal decision of the Commissioner were limited to the Education Law and to the Commissioner's Regulations, and had no intended effect on the collective bargaining agreement or the provisions
thereof, and left the salary question and any job duty comparisons
between the reclassified aides and the Teaching Assistants to
collective bargaining.
In further support of this conclusion

that the Department

of Personnel ruling had no effect on the application of the collective agreement, the Commissioner cited, Matter of Board of Education v. Ambach 70 N.Y.2d 501, which in significant part held:
"...when an employer and a union enter into
a collective bargaining agreement, an employee subject to the agreement may not sue
the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed, through the union, in
accordance with the contract... only when the
union fails in its duty of fair representation
can the employee go beyond the agreed procedure
and litigate a contract issue directly against
the employer..."
It is clear therefore, that the pay question posed in this
arbitration case

was not dealt with at all by the reclassifica-

tion ordered by the Department of Personnel and that that order
was not intended to accord the Aides, reclassified as Teaching
Assistants, the same salary schedule as the prior incumbent Teaching Assistants.
Consequently, it is a matter solely under the contract
and for first impression contract interpretation in this arbitration, without any direction or presumptions created by the reclassification order.
That leaves the posture of this arbitration case at the
point where the parties mutually agreed on a salary schedule for
a set of duties performed by the Aides, and still performed by the
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Aides, now reclassified as Teaching Assistants, without any significant change or increase in those duties or responsibilities
since that salary agreement, the reclassification not withstanding
In that respect, one thing cited by the Commissioner is significant to me.

He states that
"petitioners do not allege that their
union has failed in its duty of fair
representation..."

To me that means that when the Association negotiated a
salary schedule for the duties and

responsibilities of the Aides,

most recently in the 1986 to 1990 contract, it did so in compliance
with its duty of fair representation, and that therefore that salary schedule, albeit lower than what was negotiated for the then
incumbent Teaching Assistants, fairly compensated

them for their

work as Aides and fairly recognized a difference in duties, responsibilities, skills, etc., between the Aides and the then incumbent Teaching Assistants.

If the duties of the then Aides had

changed or had risen to the level of Teaching Assistants under the
contract that was the time to negotiate parity.

As there is in-

sufficient evidence in this record of any significant change in
the duties and responsibilities of the reclassified Teaching Assistants (or Teaching Assistants/Teacher Aides) from what they did
when classified as Aides, including some work and responsibility
they take on in "crisis intervention"

the contractual distinc-

tions between the newly classified Teaching Assistants and the
prior incumbent Teaching Assistants still obtain, as does their
different salary schedules.
Consequently, for the two groups to be paid the same remains a matter for collective bargaining or must await a showing
of significant substantive changes in duties and responsibilities

-8from what existed when the present salary schedules were "fairly"
negotiated, and is not, at present,

something that can be changed

by arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The compensation of the grievants in the
grievance filed on October 6, 1987 is
not in violation of Article IV A, Article
XXVII and Appendix B of the current agreement between Rockland BOCES and the BOCES
Staff Association.

DATED: July 11, 1989
STATE OF
)„„
.
OF New
New York )
o o•
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369 Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-C10

A W A R D
P&M Grievance No. 4019

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, make the
following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective bargaining agreement by its suspension or discharge of the grievant,
Larry Ross.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: February 10, 1990
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )&
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

Robert A. Scannell
Concurring

I, Robert A. Scannell do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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Donald E. Wightraan
Dissenting
DATED: February
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

I, Donald E. Wightman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369 Utility
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
P&M Grievance No. 4019

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by its suspension or discharge of the grievant, Larry Ross? If so,
what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held on November 15, 1989 in Braintree,
Massachusetts, at which time the grievant and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. The tripartite Board of
Arbitration in this matter consisted of Mr. Donald E. Wightman,
Union designee; Mr. Robert A. Scannell, Company designee; and
the Undersigned, as Chairman. The Oath of the Arbitrators was
waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and both
sides filed post-hearing briefs. The Board met in executive session on January 11, 1990.
The grievant is charged with "unauthorized absence from the
work location and for violation of the Company's Drug and Alcohol
Policy."
The following facts, which resulted in the grievant's suspension and discharge are not disputed.
On September 13, 1989 the grievant, a Grade a Splicer, was
| assigned to a job site in South Boston. About mid-morning, without permission, the grievant left that location, drove a Company

-2truck to the Company's Prudential Center offices, and withdrew
some money from the Credit Union.

He then drove the Company truck

to a restaurant in Roxberry where he met an unidentified person
and purchased two bags of heroin.

Thereafter, inside the truck

he ingested one or a portion of one of the bags of heroin by snort
ing it into his nostrils. At that point with white powder (later
admitted by the grievant to be heroin) on his nose, he was apprehended by two Boston City Police officers, who had been maintaining a surveillance, and placed under arrest.
The relevant part of the Company's Drug and Alcohol Policy,
promulgated in 1984 states:
"Freedom from drugs and alcohol is an essential
part of this policy...The illegal use, sale,
or possession of narcotics, drugs or controlled
substances while on the job, or on Company property, is a dischargeable offense."
It was for violation of the foregoing Policy that the grievant was discharged, following his suspension for unauthorized absence from his work assignment.
The Union's case, and its defense of the grievant, is its

i

assertion that the Drug and Alcohol Policy was unreasonable in
this case because its application to the grievant constituted disparate and uneven discipline when compared to other offending employees similarly situated. And that therefore because of its
discriminatory application to the grievant, his discharge should
be voided.
I have no quarrel with the Company's policy of discharging
an employee who possesses or uses a controlled or illegal drug on
Company property during working hours.

Clearly, the Company has

the right to protect its operations, to insure the safety of its
employees and the public it serves, from the obvious and inherent
dangers of drug use or drug trafficking on the job, especially
since employees regularly work on high voltage cables, in other
dangerous settings, including at heights, and in the operation of
Company vehicles.

Indisuptedly, mistakes can be fatal to the em-

o

ployee who has used drugs, to fellow employees in the work area,
and of potentially serious inconvenience from service disruptions,
if not danger, to the community and the citizenry.
The only real question in this case, and the Union's challenge to the instant application of the Drug and Alcohol Policy is
whether the Company legitimately can make a distinction, for discipline purposes, between employees, like the grievant, who are
found for the first time to possess and/or use drugs on the Company property during working hours, and other employees who for
the first time are found under the influence of a drug and unfit
for duty on the property, during working hours, but who have not
been found or where it cannot be determined that they ingested the
drug and/or brought it on to the property.
As I understand the application of the Drug and Alcohol
Policy, and as expressed in the record in this case, and reiterated at the executive session of the Board of Arbitration, employees who fall into the latter group are not discharged, but given
a chance at rehabilitation by mandatory referral to the Company's
rehabilitation program, with its procedures of surveillance and
regular drug testing. But employees in the former group, as in
the instant case with the grievant, are discharged.
Though under the Policy, the Company has reserved the right
to discharge in either or both circumstances, it concedes that as
a matter of practice, it has used its rehabilitation program for
first offenders in the latter category, and has not fired them
until and unless they fail to respond to or follow the rehabilitation program.
The Company distinguishes between the two situations as
follows; absent evidence to the contrary, it must assume than an
employee found under the influence or unfit for duty, possessed
and used the drug off the property and outside of working hours
whereas the grievant, and others in a similar setting, possessed
the drug and used it on the property and during working hours.
To the Company's mind, the latter set of facts constitute a much

-4more serious and egregious violation. Additionally, the Company
argues, that possession on the property opens the prospect for
sale or trafficking on the property, and that that possibility
absent from those merely found unfit and/or under the influence,
is potentially most serious, justifying a greater disciplinary
penalty. In short, the Company contends that the two situations
are markedly different and that employees involved in one or the
other are not similarly situated and that equal discipline is not
required.
The Union views it differently. It asserts that there is no
significant difference between the two categories. It argues tha
an employee under the influence of a drug or unfit for duty because of drug use had to have "possessed the drug" and indeed stil'
does (in his system), and obviously "used" the drug in order for
him to become unfit and under its influence.

Impliedly, it assert

that the Company should not infer that those unfit possessed
and/or used the drug off the property, when on property use and
possession is equally possible. Or at least that inference should
not be the basis for such dramatically different discipline discharge on one hand or a chance at rehabilitation on the other.
Additionally, and also implicit if not explicit in the Union's
case, is the position that under either or both set of facts, the
impact on the job is the same. An employee who is simply unfit,
and an employee who possesses and/or uses the drug on the property
both endanger the work and operations of the Company, and both
place themselves, fellow employees and the public at the same risk
So that again, there should not be different penalties or responses
The Union also points out that the Company's fear of drug sales on
the property is mere speculation; not part of the charge against
the grievant in this case; and absent any evidence of that offense
or its practice or realistic potential, it should not be part of
the reasons for the discharge penalty given the grievant.
There are parts of the Union's argument with which I agree.
If the sole issue is safety, I would agree with the Union that

-5employees in both categories are similarly situated.

There is no

question that the Company has the right to be primarily
with safety.

concerned

And if an employee in either category is a safety

risk of roughly equal magnitude (and I believe they are) they
should be treated similarly. Clearly any such finding and consequence would create a very serious dilemma.

To be evenhanded,

the Company would have to discharge both or offer rehabilitation
to both. The former would effectively undermine or destroy the
Company's ongoing rehabilitation program with which I have been
favorably impressed over the years, which represents an enlightened approach to drug use and which I think neither the Company
nor the Union would like to see discontinued or curtailed. The
latter, namely to provide first offense rehabilitation for employees in both groups (and apparently what the Union seeks in
this case), would, though progressive and humanitarian, accord a
one time "license" to employees to possess and/or use drugs on the
property, by confronting them with the rehabilitation program and
not traditional discipline. It seems to me that neither consequence would be jointly acceptable.
However, in the instant case there is another important
factor that does distinguish the grievant from an employee found
only to be unfit due to drug use. And I conclude that that distinction is a credible difference which, in this case at least,
separates the grievant from other employees whom the Union asserts
are similar. The difference is that the grievant committed a
crime on and with the use of Company property (the truck) when he
bought and thereafter ingested the heroin, again in the truck during hours that he should have been at work.

I conclude that the

Company and any employer has the right to protect itself against
the commission of crimes on its property, and it has that right
independent and regardless of what the police and the authorities
do to the offender. So the ultimate disposition of the criminal
charges against the grievant (which was probation and a fine) does
not pre-empt the Company's right to punish for an act that is not

-6just violative of a work rule, but also an acknowledged crime.
I cannot find that dismissal is too harsh or inappropriate
as the penalty for that offense and as a deterrent to any other
criminal activity on the property even if the arresting officer
thought a lesser penalty would be enough. This differentiates
between the grievant and others who are found unfit and offered a
second chance through a rehabilitation program.

Even if, as to

an employee in the latter category, it can be inferred possibly,
as the Union claims, that he too possessed and used drugs on the
property, it cannot be inferred that any such employee committed
a crime on Company property during working hours. The first inference may be reasonable or logical; the second inference would
be manifestly contrary to our system of criminal due process and
burden of proof.
Finally, I have not lost sight of the Union's argument that
the grievant's purchase and use of the heroin was a traumatic
reaction to a fatal accident in a manhole in which the grievant
had worked but left just before the explosion, and which killed
one of his friends. I do not discount or reject that explanation
and have no grounds to disbelieve it. Rather, in view of the
legitimate Company rule, and the crime committed, I do not think
that I have contractual authority to consider that in mitigation,
or reduce or set aside the penalty for that reason.

Consideration

of the grievant's emotional state, and whether in fact his purchase and use of heroin was proximately, exclusively or even
primarily related to the manhole explosion and his friends death,
is a matter for the Company's consideration, especially as that
connection was not clearly and convincingly established in the
record before me.

I do not disagree with the Union that the

grievant needs help with his drug problem.

It would magnanimous

for the Company to offer him that help, but to order it in lieu
of the discipline the Company chose to impose, is to substitute
my judgment for a proper managerial decision, and hence is beyond
my authority.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 10, 1990

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369, Utility
Workers Union of America

A W A R D
P&M Grievance #3838

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, make the following AWARD:
[1] The discharge of Peter Frankenberger is
reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
[2] He shall have one final chance to forthwith make and maintain his attendance at
a satisfactory level.
h

[3] He shall be reinstated without back pay,
and warned that a failure to maintain a
satisfactory record of attendance will be
cause for his summary dismissal.
DATED: June 13, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which__i_s^my AWARD.
DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

r
^., ^ _ . „ _. ^
Robert B/'Anibier
Cone urring in #1,
Dissenting from

I, Robert B. Ambler do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: ^We
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
_.- f ~

Barbara C. Foul sham
Concurring
Dissenting
I, Barbara C. Foulsham do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union No. 369, Utility
Workers Union of America "

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
P&M Grievance #3838

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by its termination of the
grievant, Peter Frankenberger on September
16, 1988? If so, what shall be the remedy,
if any?
A hearing was held on January 24, 1989 in Braintree, Massah

chusetts, at which time the grievant and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared.

Mr. Robert B. Ambler

served as the Union representative on the Board of Arbitration.
Ms. Barbara C. Foulsham served as the Company's representative on
said Board, and the Undersigned served as Chairman.

The Oath of

the Board of Arbitration was waived, as was it.s executive session.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic of the hearing was taken, arid both sides f i l e d post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged for an unsatisfactory record of
absenteeism and tardiness, culminating in his absence from work,
from August 26, 1988 to September 7, 1988.

After a call from the

grievant on August 26th that he was "sick" without further explanation, the Company heard nothing further from him and was unable tO
reach him.

On September 7th, he was sent a termination notice.

Subsequently, the Company learned that for that latter period the
grievant was voluntarily hospitalized for alcohol detoxification
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and rehabilitation.

However, it is the Company's position that

because of his prior record and short service (he was hired on
August 11, 1986) his hospitalization and efforts at alchohol treat
ment are immaterial, and that he would have been terminated nevertheless even if the Company knew of his whereabouts and the purpose of the last period of absence.
The grievant's absentee and lateness record, prior to his
discharge, was the subject of the following disciplinary measures:
A Written Reprimand on April 17, 1987 for
"abuse of sick plan;"
A Written Reprimand on November 20, 1987
for "tardiness;"
h

A Written Reprimand on May 18, 1988 for
"Tardiness;"
A Written Reprimand on July 28, 1988 for
"Tardiness;"
A Suspension and Final Warning on July 25,
1988 for "Tardiness."
As none of the foregoing were grieved or reversed by a r b i t r a tion, they are now incontestible, and stand as proper progressive
discipline imposed for the violations noted.

Accordingly, the

propriety of his disciplinary record up to the last period of absence is not disputable in this proceeding.
Also, the Company contends that he received many verbal warnings and counseling regarding his attendance record.
The Union's position is that the grievant's attendance recorc
is not so bad, if certain absences due to bona fide medical conditions are considered; that the remaining absences did not exceed
or significantly exceed the allowed sick days under the contract;
t h a t many of his absences and latenesses were due to an acknowledged alcohol problem, and that because the last period from August
26 to September 7 was for alcohol rehabilitation, pursuant to the

n

Company's Employee Assistance Program,his discharge is violative
of the rehabilitation purpose and confidentiality of that Program,
and also violative of the Massachusetts Handicap Discrimination
La w.
I conclude that I do not have authority or jurisdictional
competence under the contract to interpret and/or apply the
Massachusetts Handicap Discrimination Law.

My authority is con-

fined to the contract and therefore I leave the meaning and application of that external law to the forums that have jurisdiction,
with the rights of the parties on that point expressly reserved.
The Company is correct in its assertion that an employee
with a chronically unsatisfactory attendance record need not be
continued in employment even if the absences and latenesses are
due to reasons beyond the employee's fault or control.

An employe

is entitled to rely on regular and prompt attendance by its employees and is not expected to run its business or services with
employees who cannot meet that fundemental requirement.
The Company is also correct when it argues that its employee
assistance program or any program for alcohol r e h a b i l i t a t i o n or
for rehabilitation of any other employee personal problem is not.
a sanctuary

from discipline.

Clearly the assistance program is

for assistance with the particular problem involved, but cannot be
a substitute for or a waiver of the employer's unconditional right
to expect good and prompt attendance and to sever from its payroll employees who build up an unsatisfactory record, whether or
not in counseling or in the assistance program.

In short, it is

hoped that the assistance program will help alleviate the difficulties resulting in poor attendance, but if it fails or is resorted to late in the development of the poor record, discipline
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including discharge as the final step in the application of progressive discipline may go forward.
However, there is one material factor in the instant situation that causes me to conclude that the penalty of discharge is
slightly (and only slightly) premature.
The foregoing well settled rules, and my affirmation of the
Company's citation of those rules, are based on the circumstance
where the employee's poor attendance record is "chronic."

That

is where not only has it gone on unimproved for an extended period
of time, but there is no reasonable prospect for or evidence of
any probable improvement in the future.
The facts surrounding the grievant's record do not yet meet
that "chronic" definition.

During the grievant's first year of

employment, twenty six days of absence were due to a "twisted knee
j| that was placed in a brace, incapacitating him from working.

In

1988, the grievant was absent four days for surgical removal of a
cyst from his arm.

Both conditions were medically documented. Bot

were apparently corrected and no longer represent medical problems
which will recur or which can be used to identify a "chronic"
reason for poor attendance.
The other absences, including the last period which triggerecjl
his discharge, were apparently due to alcohol and possibly drug
abuse.

This reason may well be "chronic" as to duration and prog-

nosis.

Yet, the grievant has gone through a detoxification and

rehabilatation

program and unless one is prepared to reject such

programs as useless, it cannot be said at this point that he has
not solved or significantly improved his problem with alcohol and/
or drugs.

If he has, and the results are not yet in, the reason

for most of his poor attendance record may have abated.
is repaired.

His knee

His cyst removed and he has undertaken a bona f i d e

-5alcohol (and drug) rehabilitation program in a hospital.

In short

I am not clearly and convincingly persuaded that the grievant's
poor attendance record is "chronic" and not reasonably subject
to improvement to a satisfactory level in the near future.

Absent

a conclusion that his problems are "chronic" 1 find that he should
be given one final chance to show that his d i f f i c u l t i e s have been
solved or are under control and that henceforth his attendance
record can and will be satisfactory.
Under these circumstances, I deem that the appropriate
remedy shall be to put the grievant again on final warning and to
leave him at the last step in the chain of progressive discipline
b

by imposing a lengthy disciplinary suspension in place of his discharge.

He is expressly warned that unless his attendance record

becomes satisfactory forthwith, and remains so, the Company w i l l
have cause to "discharge him summarily.

DATED: June 13, 1989

.

^ - /,
Eric/J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405 UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12300 00149

and
Chandler Evans

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Clarence Grant on June
3, 1988 for just cause? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 18, 1989

at which time Mr. Grant|,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.
afforded

full opportunity

All concerned were

to offer evidence and argument and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The parties filed post-hear-

ing briefs.
The grievant was discharged for being out of the plant for
an extended period of time on May 27-28, 1988

during regular work-

ing hours without permission and while punched in.

The Company

charges him with falsification of records and fraudulent receipt
of wages for time not worked.
The grievant and the Union on his behalf claim that he was
out of the plant for only a total of about five minutes, and only
into the plant parking lot to first give his wife the keys to his
car at about 11:15

PM and later at about 1 AM to retrieve the keys

from her, and that he could not find his foreman those short times
to obtain official

permission.

-2The weight of the substantial and credible evidence is contrary to the grievant's claim.

In my view there is sufficient

evidence to conclude that the grievant was out of the plant, and
off Company property for a period from about 11:30

PM to 1:30 AM.

The grievant's shift that night was from 3:30 PM on May 27th,
to 5 AM on May 28th.
that at about 11:30

His foreman, Michael J. Marcikonis, testified
PM he did not see the grievant working.

At

about 12:02 AM the foreman went out of the plant to give a layoff
slip to another employee, and took that opportunity to casually
look for the grievant's car and didn't see it in the parking lot.
Thereafter, at about 12:25 the foreman returned to the parking lot
and made a careful search for the grievant's car and did not find
it in the lot.
Then the foreman returned to the plant and undertook comprehensive searches for the grievant, first at about 12:30 AM and
and again at 12:50 AM and thereafter at about 1:05 AM.

The foreman

looked throughout the areas where the grievant was assigned to
work and asked fellow employees if they had seen him.

The grievant

could not be found, nor could any one advise on whether they saw
him or where he was.
Thereafter at about 1:20 AM the foreman again looked for the
grievant's car in the parking lot and found it still missing.
The grievant, according to the foreman's testimony was first
seen back at work at about 1:45 AM.
It is undisputed that during the foregoing time, the grievant
was still punched in "on the clock" (except for an authorized lunch
period at a different time that is irrelevant to this case).

-3I accept as accurate the foregoing testimony of the foreman.
However, limited to the foregoing the Company's case might be too
circumstantial to be conclusive.

But the Company's case is not so

limited.
There is the direct testimony of the plant guard who, alerte 1
by the foreman to look out for the grievant, testified that at 1:2
AM the grievant "drove into the lot and parked his car at the #2
spot, about 20-25 feet from the ground house."

The guard stated

that she then confronted the grievant for identification.

Stating

that he "left his badge inside," the grievant however identified
himself as "Grant."

At the hearing the guard identified the g r i e v -

ant as the same person.
I find no reason why the guard should not testify truthfully
and accurately.

She was certain that the grievant drove into the

lot from the outside.

That being so, I cannot believe the griev-

ant's explanation and must conclude that he was out of the plant
and off the Company property.

It is well settled that circumstan-

tial evidence if of sufficient quantity, connection and credibilit
may be used to prove the disciplinary offense charged.

Here, the

various circumstances regarding the foreman's inability to find
the grievant in the plant after several searches, and the discernel
absence of his car from the parking lot, albeit circumstantial,
become probative and persuasive evidence when joined by the direct
and eyewitness testimony of the guard.
I conclude therefore that the Company has met its burden of
showing that the grievant was improperly out of the plant for at
least the extended period of time alleged.
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I do not quarrel with the penalty of discharge*
charges proved, and with evidence that the Company has

With the
consistently

imposed the discharge penalty for similar offenses by other employees in the past.

I cannot find the penalty of discharge too

severe.
The Company is correct in characterizing the offence as a
falsification of the time card record and the taking of pay for
time not worked.

And even if I thought a lesser penalty might be

adequate, I am not permitted to substitute my judgment for the
judgment of the Company when the penalty it did impose

is not ex-

cessive or improper.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Clarence Grant on June
3, 1988 was for just cause.

DATED: October 3, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local No. 270, Utility Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO

A W A R D
Case No. 53 300 0097 88

and
The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators in
the above-named matter and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD
Under the contract, for two hours of
the total work performed by Edward G:
Cummins on September 30 and October
1, 1987, he shall be paid at the Plant
Maintenance Mechanic A rate.

DATED: February 21, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY Of New York )

Er ic/ J . Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this in-s-trumepfc , which is my AWARD.

Mnry^/Reff^fer
CcSMHrrTiig} '
(dissenting)

/9JJ

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, Henry J. Reffner do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
I STATE OF
! COUNTY OF

ffolm E. Paganie
(concurring)
(dioocntiftg)

I, John E. Paganie do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
j Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
!

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local No. 270, Utility Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO
and
The Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Company

OPINION
of
CHAIRMAN
Case No' 53 30°

°097 88

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named

Union

and Company, the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a
tripartite Board of Arbitration, to decide, with the Union and
Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
Whether, under the contract between the
parties Edward G. Cummins is entitled to
receive a higher classification pay for
work performed by him on the dates of
September 30 and October 1, 1987.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Cleveland, Ohio on October 18, 1988, at
which time Mr. Cummins, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
I Arbitrators was waived.

The Oath of the

A stenographic record of the hearing was

taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.

Mr. John E.

Paganie served as the Company designated arbitrator and Mr. Henry
J. Reffner served as the Union designated arbitrator.
Based on the record before me, including prior arbitration
decisions which I find persuasive and therefore precedential, I
. conclude that the bare assignment of "locking and tagging" in' volved in this case is within the grievant's Mechanic B classi' fication and performance of that work does not entitle him to
Mechanic A pay.
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!

However, though the foregoing has been well settled in
this collective bargaining relationship by prior arbitration decisions, I find that it is based on circumstances where and when
the safety work preliminary to "locking and tagging." such as
disconnecting the electrical systems, the mechanical systems, and
presumably the fuel and water connections has not only been done
by other personnel such as a roving operator and an electrician,
but the assignment of that safety work to that personnel has been
effectively arranged by supervision, and the work of those craftsmen is not subject to direction and supervision by the Mechanic B.
But the foregoing conditions did not obtain fully in the
instant situation.
Supervisor Greg Schenker, who gave the grievant the dis-

: puted work assignment on the days in question, testified that he
had arranged for a roving operator and an electrician to do the
preliminary safety work and to deactivate the equipment so that the
grievant could lock and tag it, and thereafter perform prescribed
mechanical repairs.
:

However, he was surprised and could not ex~

plain why it became necessary for the grievant "to go to the office
to find people to do the preliminary work."
It is that particular phase of the work performed by the
grievant that I conclude was not expected of him, which should
have been effectuated by supervision but which the grievant did
preliminary to being able to tag and lock the equipment as safe,
that I find was beyond the B classification and within the A
classfication.
The following exchange between the Chairman and Supervisor
Schenker at the hearing significantly establishes to my mind that

'• this phase of the work was beyond the grievant's Mechanic B assign: ment on those days.
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ARBITRATOR SCHMERTZ: When you gave Mr. Cummins
the work order, did you anticipate that he
would have to lock and tag anything?
THE WITNESS: Yes, he would have, to hang his
locks and tags to make the equipment safe.
"
ARBITRATOR SCHMERTZ: You anticipated that as
part of his assignment?

|
i

THE WITNESS: Yes.

|

ARBITRATOR SCHMERTZ: Did you anticipate he
would have to go into whatever the office
was to find people to-do preliminary work before he hung his tags and locks?
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't.
It is this "arranging" that I find falls more within

i
Section A 7 of the Mechanic A Job Specifications, reading, inter'• alia

"...arranging with supervisors and Plant
Watch Engineer for clearange and removal
from service of plant electrical equipment; locking off or tagging off of plant
equipment; removing "hold off" tags when
equipment is ready for service."

than within Section A 10 of the Mechanic B Job Specifications, as
relied on by the Company, and which reads:
"Conducting the work so that assigned employees are safeguarded at all times."
However, after the grievant located the personnel to do
the preliminary safety work, I am not persuaded that the grievant
"direct(ed) their duties" or the "duties of up to three other
employees" within the meaning and intent of the Mechanic A Job
Specifications.

Indeed, absent countervailing evidence, the griev-

ant is the best judge of how much time he spent on Mechanic A
work, and what that work was.

He testified that over the two days

in question he spent a total of "two hours" on work within the
Mechanic A classification;

He also testified that his claim in

his grievance and in this arbitration is for "two hours pay at the
! A rate."
From this testimony together with my other findings of
fact, I conclude that the two hours that the grievant referred to
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i was the time he spent in seeking and arranging for personnel like
I
a roving operator and electrician and reversing the process at the
conclusion of the work.

By limiting the time to two hours he is

conceding that he did not direct that personnel in the performance
of their duties as would a Mechanic A.

In short, his claim is

limited to handling the preliminary and concluding "arrangements"
: that should have been done, or done more effectively by supervision, or could have been done properly by a Mechanic A under
that Job Specification.
Also, I accept as reasonable, as the best evidence, and
as accurate, his time estimate of two hours for that work, for
both days.

I do not find it improper to include the time he had

to wait until the operator and electrician became available, and
to equally apportion the time as one hour for each day.
With that testimony and limited claim, I reject the Union's
claim on behalf of the grievant for sixteen hours of pay at the A
rate .
Also, in further support of my conclusion that he worked
in the Mechanic A classification for two hours, and that his claim
limited to two hours of pay at the A rate, is his unrefuted testimony that on other occasions, under similar circumstances, he was
paid both at the higher rate and only for the time spent on a
specific higher rated job duty.
Article IX Section 4 of the contract reads in pertinent
:part:
"An employee assigned temporarily and for
one hour or more in any one day to work
of higher classification shall be paid the
appropriate rate for such higher classification during such temporary assignment."
The facts of this case fall substantially within the
language and meaning of that contract clause.

-5Accordingly,

for two hours of the work performed by the

grievant on September 30 and October 1, 1987, he is entitled to
and should be paid at the Mechanic A rate.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Chai/man
DATED: February 21, 1989

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1-2, AFL-CIO

CHAIRMAN'S RULING
on SCOPE of ISSUE
and ARBITRABILITY
Case #1330 1243 8i

and
Consolidated Edison Co., Inc.

There are two threshold procedural issues which require
rulings by the Chairman of the Board of Arbitration.

They are

the scope of the issue(s) submitted to arbitration, and whether
that or those issues are arbitrable.
Hearings were held on February 27 and March 8, 1989 at
which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Union challenges the right of the Company to require,
involuntarily, membership and service on the fire brigade by employees classified as chemical technicians and nuclear plant operators, and challenges the right of the Company to require those
employees (and apparently any member of the fire brigade) to take
a stress test.
The Company claims that the sole issue in dispute and the
issue mutually submitted to arbitration is the challenge to its
requirement that fire brigade members take a stress test.
Also, it is the Company's position that the issue or
issues, whether confined to its single issue or encompassing both
as advanced by the Union is or are not arbitrable.
Let me deal with the arbitrability question first.
clear that I have the contractual authority to do so.

It is

Article
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XII Section 48 (3) reads:
If a question arises as to whether or not
a particular claim of grievance is a grievance as defined in this Article, the question may be taken up through the grievance
procedures herein provided for, and may be
submitted to arbitration if need be, at the
instance of either party (emphasis added).
The contractual definition of a grievance and particularly its exclusions are dispositive of the Company's claim of non~
arbitrability with regard to the one issue

both sides agree has

been properly submitted to arbitration, namely the stress test
for fire brigade members.
Article XII Section 48 defines a grievance
...as any controversejry, dispute or difference arising out of the meaning or application of this contract or affecting the relationship between any employee or the Local
Union and the Company.
Paragraph

(2) thereof sets forth the exclusions.

It state;

Changes in general business practice, the
manner of operating units of the business,
the control and direction of working forces,
the selection of personnel subject, however
to the specific provisions or to seniority
and for the various preferences, the performance of the Company's public obligations as
a regular public utility, and other business
and operating questions, shall not give rise
to a grievance of employees or of the Local
Union. (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that the Company is subject to and
must comply with the Rules and Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I deem such compliance to fall within the de-

finition of "performance of the Company's public obligations as
a regulated public utility" within the meaning of the aforesaid
paragraph

(2) .

Part 50 App. R, Section III (Specific Requirement) Paragraph H. of the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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reads in pertinent part:
Fire Brigade. A site fire brigade trained
and equipped for fire fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire
fighting capability for all areas of the
plant containing structures, systems, or
components important to safety. The fire
brigade shall be at least five members on
each shift. The brigade leader and at least
two brigade members shall have sufficient
training in or knowledge of plant safetyrelated systems to understand the effects of
fire and fire suppressants on safet shutdown capabilty. The qualification of fire
brigade members shall include an annual
physical examination to determine their
ability to perform strenuous fire fighting
act ivities. . .(emphasis added).
I am satisfied that a physical examination to determine
ability to perform strenuous activities can be properly in the
form of a "stress test."
As the Company is bound by these Rules, as the Rules or
Regulations are Public Law, and as the Rule is mandatory (it uses
the word "shall" in ordering the establishment of a fire brigade
and the physical examination for ability to perform strenuous
activities), I must find that compliance therewith is a "public
obligation' within the meaning of those items in Paragraph (2)
of Article XII Section 48 which may not be in the subject of a
grievance, and which per force may not be arbitrated.
Put another way, the Company's public and statutory duty
to test fire brigade members for physical stress capability is
expressly excluded under the contract from the grievance procedure
and from arbitration.
Therefore, the Union's general challenge to the Company's
administration of a stress test to members of the fire brigade
which the Union has
arbitrable.

made an issue in this proceeding, is not
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However, the Union may grieve and arbitrate the content of these
tests if it believes they are unrelated to the

duties of the

fire brigade and therefore substantively improper and/or may, on
a case by case basis, challenge the validity and/or propriety of
how the test was administered and/or the accuracy of its results.
But I do find arbitrable, if it is part of the issue
properly submitted to arbitration, the Union's challenge to the
involuntary assignment to the fire brigade of employees in the
classifications of chemical technician and nuclear plant operators.

In doing so, I make no determination at this time on the

dispute between the parties over whether in fact those classified
employees previously served on the fire brigade, voluntarily or
involuntarily.

That is a matter on the merits and not relevant

to arbitrability.
The NRG only requires the Company to establish a fire
brigade of "at least five members each shift."

It does not iden-

tify or determine which employees and what classifications are
eligible.

Clearly, under the NRC rules, the fire brigade can be

made up of employees of any or various classifications, separately
or collectively, and still be in compliance.

Therefore the Union';

claim that the employees classified as chemical technicians and
nuclear plant operators should not be required to be members of
the brigade because their job duties do not provide for or contemplate that service, and because, as alleged, historically they
have served only voluntarily,

is a dispute that falls within that

part of the definition of a grievance that makes grievable (and
arbitrable)
"disputes or differences... affecting the
relationship between any employee ... and
the Company."

-5What remains is the question of whether the Union's
challenge to the assignment of certain classified employees to
the fire brigade was "grieved" and submitted to arbitration in
this case.

And if so, with what specificity.

In the absence of a jointly signed submission to arbitration, the best evidence of the scope of an issue(s) is what was
processed through and bilaterally discussed in the steps of the
grievance procedure before referral to arbitration.

That is not

helpful here, because following oral discussions between representatives of the parties when the dispute(s) arose, there was
no subsequent grievance step

employed, as the parties agreed

instead to go right to arbitration.

The evidence and testimony

of the oral discussions are sharply conflicting and inconclusive
one way or the other.

So those discussions, at least the reports

of them in this arbitration, are not helpful or determinative.
That leaves the documents relating to the dispute(s) involved in this case and to what was referred to arbitration.

I

disagree with the Company's view that those documents are clear
and supportive of the Company's position.
of August 9, 1988,

The Union's telegram

from Mr. Henry Helmer its then Business Manager

to Thomas Galvin, the Company's Vice President of Industrial Relations is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations.

It can

be of course interpreted as referring only the stress test dispute
to arbitration.

But by "demand( ing)immediate arbitration of the

outstanding issues concerning the right of Consolidated Edison to
require all employees who function as the fire brigade...to take
a stress test...," (underscoring supplied) the plural word "issues'
could reasonably have been intended to encompass the disagreements
over the manning of the brigade as well as the stress test.
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The Company's letter to the Arbitration

Association,

commencing the arbitration process, was, I am sure,submitted in
good faith and
arbitrated.

represented what the Company thought was to be

But it

was unilateral and selfserving.

And I do not

think that the Union had to object to its short-hand caption to
preserve its rights over the issue to be arbitrated.

It is well

settled that this type of correspondence it not like "common law
pleadings"and not technically prejudicial in the framing of the
issue.
More significant, to my mind, is the memorandum of August
3, 1988 from a group of Chemical Technicians to Mr. S. Brain, the
Company's Nuclear Power Vice President.

That memorandum objected

to the Company's "intention to impose additional fire brigade requirements on the Nuclear Production Technicians
Section."

in the Chemistry

I consider it immaterial that this objection was not put

on a traditional grievance form or cast in grievance language.
What is material is that it represents a disagreement between those
employees and the Company over involuntary assignment to the fire
brigade and put in issue at that time and for this case the question of whether those employees could be required to be part of the
brigade.

I am satisfied that the Company was thereby put on notice

that those employees were objecting to the assignments or planned
assignments.

And, in view of the mutually agreed to waiver of

the grievance procedure, those objections were and remain part of
the dispute in the instant case.

That there may be other and sub-

sequent written and possibly duplicate grievances filed by the
Union covering these grievances do not, standing alone,

oust the

complaints of the classified employees referred to in the August
3rd memorandum from the instant case.
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I shall assume, because the record is not clear, that the
classification of the employees in that memorandum, referred to
therein as "Senior Nuclear Production Technicians" or as "Watch
Chemist" or as "Chemist" are the Chemical Technicians on whose
behalf the Union is grieving and arbitrating in this case.

On

that basis I find that the issue includes that and those grievances
In short, what remains in dispute for further arbitration on the
merits is the question of whether the Company can involuntarily
assign Chemical Technicians to the fire brigade.
Finally, if the memorandum of August 3, 1988 expressly
covers by the classifications referred to therein, the "Nuclear
Plant Operators," then the remaining issue for arbitration on the
merits also includes the question of whether the Company can involuntarily assign nuclear plant operators to the fire brigade.
But, if the classifications in the August 3, 1988 memorandum do
not cover the nuclear plant operators, then, because there is
insufficient evidence showing any "grievance" or complaint, on
their behalf, those operators are not part of this arbitration and
their grievances or objections regarding assignment to the fire
brigade are not within the scope of the issue to be arbitrated
in this case.

DATED: June 27, 1989
Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 I.B.T.

OPINION AND .AWARD
Case #1330 079 88

and
The Dannon Company, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Under the collective bargaining agreement
dated April 1, 1986 through April 1, 1991,
what if any would be the appropriate changes
in wages and pension benefits for covered
production and distribution employees to be
effective April 1, 1988 and for the balance
of the contract?
A hearing was held on October 5, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
hearing

The parties filed post-

statements.
Considering the Company's economic condition (including its

present share of the yogurt market as compared to the past, and
increased costs, in significant part from its purchase by two
successive owners in 1959 and 1981 respectively), its competitive
position in relation to other yogurt companies, its present scale
of wages and pension benefits as compared to its other employees at
other locations, and as compared to others in the industry and
related industries, the cost of living increases during the contract period, the relation of wage increases as compared to cost
of living increases over the last several years, and all other
relevant data and evidence submitted in this case, I conclude that:
1. The covered employees should not suffer
a decrease in purchasing power or relative position vis a vis the cost of living
by any wage increase that is less than the
increased cost of living for the relevant
measuring period.
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2. While the wages of the covered employees
should reflect the increased competition
the Company faces for a share of the yogurt
market and any decreased profitability
resulting therefrom, the employees should
not bear the burden of increased debt or
debt service arising from the sale of the
Company to a new and different owner or
from increased debts from any "leveraged
buyouts" related thereto.
3. The Company's economic position and "ability
to pay" does not justify a continuation of
wage increases of "lump sums" that are not
applied to the basic wage rates. I find no
persuasive basis for the argument that because the covered employees now earn wages
greater than competitors (and others employed
by the Company at other locations) those other
employees and their employers should first
"catch up" before the covered employees are
granted increases in wage rates.
I do not find the Company to be in such an
adverse competititive or economic position
that the superior wage benefits obtained by
the covered employees through collective bargaining should be eroded relative to others,
by wage increases in lump sums rather than
increased wage rates.
4. The final positions of the parties as set
forth in their briefs are too far apart and
unsupported by the evidence for either to be
granted. The Company's last position, structured in lump sums, is rejected as in appropriate and inadequate for the reasons set forth
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above. Conversely,
the Union's l,ast position is too large a demand, considering all the foregoing findings,
and in excess of what the evidence and applicable patterns would justify.
5. The pattern established by my earlier Award
on wage and pension benefits for the clerical
employees, is a pattern that is consistent
with and justifiably based on the evidence in
this case and the realities both sides must
face. With the exception of some merit increases,
the dollar wage increases in that Award are increases in tbe rates, and on the average represent
a 5% wage increase in each of the three years
of the contract.
6. The present relative wage position of each
covered employee with each other in the
respective classifications, and among the

-3classifications, should be maintained, and
therefore the wage increase should be in a
percentage form across the board, rather
than in a fixed dollar amount. Also, the
wage increases should take into some consideration the additional merit increases I accorded
two clerical employees. But this should be
tempered by a recognition that the Company should
not be unduly prejudiced by those merit grants.
7. There is inadequate evidence to differentiate
the pension improvement case for the covered
employees from the case for clerical employees.
As I declined to improve pension benefits for
the latter, the same shall apply to the covered
production and distribution employees.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The wage rates .of the covered production and
distribution employees shall be increased by
5-5 per cent effective April 1, 1988, an additional 5.5 per cent effective April 1, 1989,
and an additional 5.5 per cent effective April
1, 1990.
There shall be no changes in the pension benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 23, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss " :
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Friedwald House HRF

FINAL AWARD

and

LOCAL 144 S.E.I.U.

In accordance with a jointly signed letter dated
June 20, 1989 (the "Friedwald side letter") and the Local 144
-

Southern

agreement

NY

(the

RHCF

Association

collective

"Southern Contract") executed

bargaining

by

Friedwald

House HRF ("Friedwald") on June 20, 1989, Friedwald made an
application

before

reimbursement-based

me,

as

interest

arbitrator,

relief from the wage

for

improvements and

lump sum payments due under the Southern Contract in calendar
years

1986

and

1987

for

which

Friedwald

claims

full

reimbursement has not been received.
Both Friedwald and the Union appeared before me
on August 17, 1989 with counsel, accountants
and have presented
regarding

evidence and their

Friedwald 's

af fordability

and witnesses,

respective

to

positions

implement the wage

improvements and lump sum payments due under the Southern
Contract in calendar years 1986 and 1987.
Friedwald submitted a detailed calculation of the
claimed shortfall

in each of calendar years 1986 and 1987

which essentially conforms to the formula and definitions set
forth

in subparagraph 7 of the Reimbursement

Southern Contract.

Clause of the

This formula is based on the new RUGS-II

Medicaid reimbursement methodology in effect since January 1,
1986.

The Union's shortfall

calculations are essentially

identical to Friedwald's, but several deductions are applied
to

the

Medicaid

calendar

years

Labor
1986

Costs

and

reported

1987.

by

Under

Friedwald
either

set

for
of

calculations, the established annual shortfall, as that term
is defined in subparagraph 7(u) of the Reimbursement Clause,
is greater

than the dollar cost of the relief sought by

Friedwald.

Friedwald

has

not

sought

relief

from

the

obligation to make the full fund contributions provided for
in the Southern

Contract, nor am I empowered to grant any

such relief.
Accordingly, based on the record before me, I
conclude that Friedwald is not affordable to the extent of
paying the lump sum payments due under subparagraphs 2(a)(1)
and

(3) of

retroactively

the

Southern

Contract

in

1986

and

1987, or

implementing in calendar years 1986 and 1987

the 4% base wage increase effective November 3, 1986 or the
4% base wage increase effective October 1, 1987.

Both of

these 4% base wage increases shall be implemented effective
January 1, 1988.

- 2 -

This

Award

is

based

on

the

particular

circumstances and facts of this case and this home (which is
a "non-parity" home), and establishes no precedent for any
other home or facility or for any other proceeding.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

Dated:

October

, 1989
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STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

) ss. :

I, ERIC J. SCHMERTZ,

do hereby affirm upon my

Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my Final Award.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

- 4 -

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. MTC-435-90

General Dynamics
Electric Boat Division
The issue is the Union's grievance No. MTC-435~90, which,
as amended at the hearing reads:
The Metal Trades Council of New London County,
AFL-CIO charges General Dynamics, Electric
Boat division with violations of the Preamble,
Article I and any other provisions of the current Labor Agreement, and past practice.

V .A

The Union contends that on April 14, 1989,
after reaching an impasse, the Company advised the Union of its intent to unilaterally implement the provisions of its drug
and alcohol program, which is a document
dated March 27, 1989 entitled Memorandum of
Understanding. specifically the Company is
violating our agreement by its intent to unilaterally implement the program in the following respects:
1. Changing the "under the influence" standard of 0.1 to "impairment" 0.04.
2. Requiring employees to take breathalizer
tests under threat of discharge for insubordination for refusal.
3. Mandating random testing.
The Union demands that the Employer:
1. Cease and desist.
2. Make whole all employees affected by these
continuing violations.
Hearings were held on February 1, March 2 and March 5, 1990
at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

-2and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The
Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and
the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
What is before me is whether the Company's action in unilaterally promulgating its new alcohol and drug policy as referred to in the grievance violated the contract. What is not before
me, because I was not given that authority, is whether the Company s
action violated the National Labor Relations Act. Subsumed in
the latter, and also not before me, is the question of whether the
"impasse" referred to in the grievance was the type of collective
bargaining impasse under the Act which would allow the Company
thereafter to unilaterally implement its drug and alcohol policy
as proposed to, but not accepted by the Union during negotiations
thereon.

I leave these matters to the National Labor Relations

Board which has jurisdiction thereof, and the positions and rights
of the parties in that forum are expressly reserved.
On the contract issue I find the Company's action (or its
plan to so act) to be impermissible. Article XXVII of the contract notwithstanding, I conclude that the policies regarding
alcohol and drugs which pre-existed the changes referred to in
the grievance were long established work rules, initially promulgated unilaterally by the Company, but over time bilaterally accep
ed and relied upon. Drug use and/or possession was a summary discharge offense.

Relevent to this case, the proscribed level of

alcohol was .10; discipline was applied pursuant to a bi-laterally
negotiated "5-15 and out" policy; a breathalizer, though not used
in the early years, was introduced along the way, and employees
were disciplined for positive breathalizer readings as well as for
observable symptoms of intoxication.

But it is unclear whether

employees were disciplined for the bare refusal to take the breathalizer test, irrespective of reasonably suspicious symptoms.

If

the new policy contemplates that, it must be viewed as a change.
At least as to the prior alcohol policy, I find that that

-3long standing practice had become a condition of employment and
hence tantamount to a contractual agreement, which as a matter of
contract, and limited thereto, could be changed or eliminated
only by negotiated agreement.
The prior alcohol policy became a contractual agreement
in three ways. First, under the well settled rule that accords
contractual status to a long standing, bilaterally accepted and
relied on practice which is not inconsistent with the collective
bargaining agreement.
Second, by negotiating

the written "5~15-out" discipline

policy, which expressly provides for discipline for violations
of the alcohol policy, and by renewing that agreement at each
successor contract negotiations, there is joint acknowledgement
of a mutually recognized and accepted alcohol policy to which the
discipline relates. Had that policy remained only a Company promulgated work rule, the joint negotiations and renewal of a discipline policy related thereto would have been unnecessary. The
Company could have imposed discipline unilaterally.
Third, and most determinative in my view, is the fact that
when the Company sought to change the policy by lowering the
alcohol standard from .10 to .04, by introducing a possibly different basis for disciplining for refusals to take a breathalizer
test, and by "random testing," it entered into negotiations with
the Union. For months, proposals and comments were exchanged and
a number of negoitation sessions were held before an "impasse"
was reached and recognized. To my mind, those negotiations, initiated by the Company are persuasive evidence that the Company
believed that its prior alcohol policy was or had evolved into a
bilateral agreement, and that changes required bi-lateral negotiations .
In short, for the three foregoing reasons, the Company is
now estopped from denying the bi-lateral and contractual nature
of its prior alcohol policy. There is nothing in the record (and

-4little attention was paid to it by the parties) which compels any
different conclusion or anything relevantly different with regard
to drugs.
Article XXVII
ing.

Section 1 does not mandate a different find-

That provision is ambiguous.

The long standing practice

involved in this case does not constitute a "variation" of the
terms or provisions of the contract. The contract itself is silent
on the drug and alcohol policy. For the same reason it is not an
"alteration" of the contract. It is not clear to me, and therein
lies the ambiguity, whether the words "agreement" and "understanding" do or do not refer to "variations" of the contract. In other
words, are "agreements" and "understandings" standing alone not
binding if not in writing, or is the proscription on "agreements"
and "understandings" that vary the contract. The latter is also
not the impact here.

And the former may only be applicable if not

ambiguous. In the face of the ambiguity I am satisfied that the
well settled rule that transforms a long-standing practice not in
conflict with the contract, into contractual status, should prevail here .
That there was not agreement on the changes the Company
sought through negotiations means that the practice and its contractual import were not extinguished or altered.

Like any other

contract provision that one side fails to change or delete in bargaining it remained in full force and effect with the final negotiations of the successor collective agreement. That is the contractual status of the matter in this case. Whether the NLRA and
the law thereunder relating to impasses and an employers right to
implement its impasse pre-empts this contractual finding or otherwise, I leave to the NLRB and/or proceedings under the Act.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Limited to the contract, and without any find-

-5ing under the NLRA, the Union's grievance
MTC-435-90 is sustained. The Company has
or would violate the contract by:
1. Changing the "under the influence"
standard of 0.1 to "impairment" 0.04.
2. Requiring employees to take breathalizer tests under threat of discharge
for insubordination for refusal; to
the extent that this requirement is different from the past practice.
3. Mandating random testing.
The relief the Union seeks in its grievance is
granted.

DATED: September 4, 1990
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE Local 201

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 0556 88

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the removal from the job of Robert
Madden on April 21, 1987 appropriate
under the circumstances? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 7, 1988 in Boston,
Massachusetts, at which time Mr. Madden, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic re-

cord was taken; and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was removed from the highly skilled job IR23
lathe operator for "unsatisfactory performance," and placed in an
IR20 lathe operator position, "a job that requires less skill,
where tolerances required were lower, and where the pieces were
less valuable."
The Company states that its action was "non-disciplinary"
and pursuant to that part of its Code of Plant Conduct which reads:
"When in the judgment of the supervisor an
employee is for any reason not performing
on his or her job classification in a satisfactory manner, he or she will be removed from that job classification and referred to Employment for placement in a
classification...commensurate with his or her
skill and ability. Normally an employee involved in this type of situation is not an
undesirable employee and needs only to be
assigned work for which he or she is better
suited. (emphasis added).
Though that provision has some ambiguity in it, I deem the
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underscored language, as applied to the facts in this case,
together with that portion of the Company's opening statement that
its action was proper under its managerial right to "remove a person from a job for inability to perform the job" (emphasis added),
to mean that in the instant case the Company determined that the
grievant lacked the ability to perform the IR23 lathe job satisfactorily .
The Union contends that the grievant's removal was
disciplinary.
Though the grievant did not testify, the "pleadings" leading to the arbitration, including the grievance meetings, disclose
that the Company's charge against the grievant is that he performed a particular job assignment on a machine piece for the
United States Navy, in a wrongful, negligent and incompetent manner
particularly with regard to measuring for the close tolerance of
the "final cut," thereby making a cut deeper than specified, with
attendant irreparable damage in the amount of $70,000.

More

particularly, I deem the facts to be that the grievant used a
digital readout device, anon-calibrated instrument; that the
digital readout was imprecise and inaccurate, whether because of
its non-calibrated type or because of malfunction, and that a cut
that was too deep resulted.

The Company claims that for the close

tolerances involved, the grievant should have used a calibrated
micrometer with a combination square, and possibly a dip guage.
It asserts that as an employee in this highly skilled classification, who had made similar but less damaging mistakes in the past,
the grievant knew and had been told not to rely on the digital
readout.

On this, the Company's position was stated by William

Casey, the Union Relations Specialist:
"...to rely on an un-calibrated instrument such
as a digital readout to machine finish dimensions shows a lack of prudence and care;

-3-

a lack of prudence and care that is completely
unacceptable in the highest graded lathe job in
the entire plant."
The initial question is whether by this error the grievant
has shown an " inability'.' to do the job, and whether, under the
Code of Conduct he should be non-disciplinarily placed in a job
"commensurate with his skill and ability," meaning in my view an
implied "lesser" skill and ability.
I find the Company's conclusion on this point to be erroneus.

It is clear, and virtually stipulated in the record that

even if the grievant used the wrong tool and the wrong methodology,
he is fully capable of following the correct methodology and has
the skills and ability to effectively use the proper tools.

This

is evidenced by the following exchange between the Arbitrator and
Mr. Casey at the hearing:
"THE ARBITRATOR: I take it there is no question
about his ability to use the combination square
and the depth micrometer and these more precise measuring instruments?
THE WITNESS: I know firsthand that Mr. Madden
was trained in that we were apprentices together .
THE ARBITRATOR: Is there any doubt in your mind
that if he had used these devices the way you
testified he should have used them, that he
would have been able to do this cut accurately?
THE WITNESS: Yes."
The grievant's mistake therefore was not because he did
not have the ability to follow proper or prescribed work procedures
but because he used a different procedure than what the Company
claims he should have employed.

But there is no serious dispute

over the fact that he had the skill and

ability to do what the

Company thought he should have done.
That being so, I do not see this case as a removal from a
higher rated job

and an assignment

to a lesser rated job because

-4-

the former was beyond the employee's ability and the latter "commensurate with his ability."

Rather, even if the Company did not

wilfully intend it that way I view it as "punishment" for the
costly mistake he made and for his work record which included one
or more prior production errors.

Put another way, if the grie-

vant's "poor work record" was not due to "inability," the standard
contemplated by the Code and Management Rights has not been met,
and there remains only disciplinary action to redress the claimed
unsatisfactory record.
Therefore, by the facts adduced, the case is transformed,
possibly unintentionally, into a disciplinary matter and with the
Union I agree with that identification.

The grievant's production

error, against the backdrop of his prior production difficulties,
would, standing alone, justify discipline.

But it does not stand

alone.
During the hearing it was acknowledged by both sides that
Mr. Thomas Shinnick, Jr. was one of the best, if not the best,
IR23 lathe operator.

His high reliability, capability, produc-

tivity and extensive experience are well recognized by the parties
For ten years up to 1987 he worked on the same lathe as did the
grievant.

He testified that he used the digital readout "every

day" and used it, "regularly" "for blocking out dovetail cuts."
He further testified that he blocked out dovetail cuts without
using a micrometer or combination square, relying only on the
digital readout.

He also testified that though at times he used

the micrometer to measure or "block out the first cut," subsequent cuts were done relying only on the digital readout.

And

that of course, when or if the digital readout is malfunctioning
he'd use the micrometer.

To my mind, Mr. Shinnick's testimony

means that with the availability of the digital readout he relies
on it heavily and even preferentially, to do the same work that the
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grievant did.

The following exchange between the Arbitrator and

Mr. Shinnick supports the conclusion that a preferential reliance
was placed on the digital readout to make the critical cut:
THE ARBITRATOR: Could what happened to Mr.
Madden have happened to you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE ARBITRATOR: How?
THE WITNESS: Doing the exact same thing,
relying on the digital reader.
THE ARBITRATOR: In other words, after the
first cut that you checked, even the first
one I suppose if you took the cut using the
digital meter to the tolerance and then you
checked it, you could have gone over the
tolerance?
THE WITNESS: Sure.
It seems to me that if the highly regarded Mr. Shinnick did
the same work or the bulk of it in the same way, and if, as he
did, acknowledges

that he could have made the same error because

of the same reliance on the digital readout, the grievant should
not be punished for doing it that way too.

I recognize that

though Mr. Shinnick makes use of the micrometer more than did the
grievant, (in making the first cut, and, in what is irrelevant
here, in checking the accuracy of the cut after it is made) he
nonetheless relied solely on the digital readout so often that
one may treat their work practices as substantially similar.
However, the grievant (and Shinnick too) would be subject to
discipline for errors caused by the use and total reliance on the
digital readout if the Company had adequately instructed the operators not to use that device, or to use it differently, or to perform the work assignment differently than how the grievant (and
Shinnick) did it.

I do not find that the Company gave or provided

such adequate instruction.

There is no work manual setting forth
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the proper procedure for this type of work.
vant was trained by Shinnick.

Basically, the grie-

The digital readout was not an un-

authorized, makeshift or "bootleg" device.
work stations by the Company, presumably

It was placed at the

to be used by the oper-

ators, and, as stated by Shinnick replaced a calibrated dial on the
lathe in 1983 or 1984.

There is no evidence that the Company in-

structed the operators not to use the digital readout in the manner used by the grievant.

He was instructed not to use it when he

had made prior errors, because at that time it was "malfunctioning"
and required repairs.
did if it

He was not told not to use it the way he

was functioning well.

The prohibition was not general

or even applicable to its use to block out and travel down the
cut, but rather limited to situations when it was jammed with a
chip or otherwise malfunctioning.

If it was intended as a pro-

hibition to what the grievant did here, it was at best ambiguous
and ineffectively communicated.

Of course the grievant and the

operators must be mindful of the possibility that the digital readout may be jammed or malfunctioning, and must not use it then, but
that is much different from instructing operators not to use it
to make cuts to the tolerances involved, when the digital readout
appears to be functioning well.

Here, until the error was dis-

covered, there is no evidence that the digital readout was malfunctioning.

If the Company wants the operators not to use the

digital readouts generally and uniformly as the grievant and
apparently Shinnick have used it, it must be more specific, more
instructive and more prohibitive that it has been or was with the
grievant.
Under the foregoing circumstances I find inadequate justification for the grievant's removal.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs
parties makes the following

and allegations of the above-named
AWARD:

The removal from the job of Robert Madden
on April 21, 1987 was not appropriate under the circumstances.
The parties have stipulated that they can
work out the proper remedy under the foregoing Award.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 13, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) SS '"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual, described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
I. U. E. Local 201

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #HE30-1740-£

and

General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Richard Pyburn for
just cause? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on October 27, 1988 in Boston,
Massachusetts at which time Mr. Ryburn, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named
and Company appeared.

Union

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record

was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The accusation against the grievant, which caused his
discharge, is that he smoked a marijuana cigarette during working
hours and on plant premises at about 1 AM on August 5, 1987.
The Company's Code of Conduct provides that "discharge
may be imposed" for:
"Use or possession of illegal drugs (including marijuana) on Company property..."
The Union does not dispute this Code provision and does
not dispute the propriety of that penalty for that offense.

Rather

in this case, the Union's position is that the grievant was not
smoking or participating in the smoking of a marijuana cigarette,
sven if three other employees who were in the proximate area at
the time, just outside the plant building, were doing so.

-2-

Criticalj is the testimony of Karen Mclntyre, a Company
security guard.

It was she who testified that she smelled mari-

juana as she approached the doors, outside of which were the grievant and the others, and saw the four employees, including the
grievant, pass a cigarette among them with each taking turns
ing a drag."

"tak-

It was she who testified that when she confronted

the four employees whom she stated were seated close to each other
on a bench and spool, one of them (David Velez) flipped the cigarette behind the bench.
Because the incident took place at 1 AM on Company property, but outside a building, and because I could not judge at the
hearing what the lighting conditions were and whether

if the light-

ing was poor, Ms. Mclntyre could not have seen the events clearly
or may have erred in what she thought she saw, I requested the
opportunity to view the site under replicated circumstances.

With

the agreement of the parties, and with the presence of representatives of both sides, I viewed the site on a night subsequent to the
hearing.

At that time, the representatives

of the parties stipu-

lated that the lighting and location was similar to what they were
on August 5, 1987.
I now conclude that there was sufficient light outside the
building for Mclntyre
were doing.

to see what the grievant and the other three

Considering the breeze I experienced coming from out-

side the plant at the location she testified she smelled marijuana,

1

conclude that she could and indeed did smell marijuana at that
intj before proceeding to the door to observe the employees and

before confronting

them.

I find no reason why Mclntyre should falsify her testimony
and I am satisfied that she testified credibly and accurately.
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Though she was not completely clear on where each employee sat,
though in close proximity with each other, and forgot that one left
quickly after being confronted, I am satisfied that on the critical
points, particularly her observation of the grievant sharing the
cigarette, her testimony was honest and reflective of what was
going on.
I conclude therefore that she saw each of the four seated
in close proximity to each other; that they passed around a cigarette; that each, including the grievant took a "drag" on it; and
that Velez tossed it away when confronted.
I also conclude that the cigarette was marijuana.

The

testimony of Sargent Angus Clarke, who retreived the cigarette
residue, along with a package of cigarette paper inside of a
Marlboro cigarette package, and the report from the laboratory to
whom it was submitted for testing are basically uncontroverted.
Finally, in this regard, I am satisfied that the connection between
the cigarette retreived and the employees, including the grievant,
has been adequately established by the standard of proof required
in a disciplinary rather than a criminal proceeding.
Having accepted Mclntyre's testimony that the grievant
joined in smoking that cigarette, I reject his assertion that he
was smoking a regular tobacco cigarette.

A marijuana cigarette

not a tobacco cigarette is the type passed back and forth for
participatory smoking.
Also and accordingly I reject the grievant's testimony
that he was seated some distance away from the others and that what
was "passed back and forth" was his cigarette lighter.
The grievant's credibility on the use of marijuana is
questionable.

He admits that he knew that David Velez smoked mari-

juana generally, and even did so in his, the grievant's, car when

-4they drove back and forth to work.

He and David Velez are friends.

He tolerated Velez's smoking, even in the confines of his car.
These admitted circumstances make more probable and probative
Mclntyre's testimony that the grievant joined his friend, and the
others, on the morning in question, in smoking the marijuana cigarette.
The drug test which the grievant took several days after
the incident, which was negative, and which he presented to the
Company, and his offer, at the time of the incident to take a drug
test, are irrelevant.

The grievant was discharged for "possession

and use" of marijuana in violation of the Code of Conduct.

He is

not charged with nor was he discharged for "being under the influence of marijuana."

The former is enough to sustain a discharge;

the latter need not be proved.
To my knowledge and in my experience, drug tests measure
whether there is enough marijuana acid in the body to produce
"intoxication" or to be "under its influence."

Casual use, or use

in a small quantity, as was the case here, is probably not measureable.

Hence a later administered test, or even one administered

at the time, would not necessarily prove or disapprove "use or
possession."

So, neither the grievant's offer to take a test, nor

the negative results of the test subsequently taken by the grievant himself are probative or determinative regarding the charge
against him and for which he was discharged.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
laving duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievant, Richard Pyburn, committed a
Code of Conduct offense which "normally result(s) in the employee's discharge." Therefore the discharge of Richard Pyburn was for
just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: February 22, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
OUNTY OF New York ) '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Globe Employees Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130-1239 88

and
GJobe Newspaper

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the publisher has violated
the contract by prohibiting the periodic
presence of Bank of Boston representatives
in the Boston Globe Employees Association
office space provided by the Employer at
the Employer's Morrissey Boulevard plant?
And if so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on March 13, 1989 at which time the
above-named Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
and the Company, referred to as the "Publisher" or "Employer,"
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the hearing
taken; and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The nature of the planned activity of the representatives
of the Bank of Boston is set forth in an announcement by the Union
to its members in its Newsletter.

That announcement read:

The BGEA in conjunction with the Bank of
Boston will be offering banking services
out of the union office once a month. A
representative from the Bank of Boston
will be in the union office to assist you
in obtaining mortgages and student loans
as well as addressing any other banking
needs or questions you may have. The representative will help you do all paper
work etc. in the union office as well as
deliver to you at the Globe any relevant
documents. Please note the union will not
be responsible for any of the business that
transpires.
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The Company objected to the plan; notified the Union that
it would not allow Bank representatives on the premises and that
the plan was beyond the scope and meaning of "union business" as
referred to in Article X paragraph 9 of the collective bargaining
agreement.

That section reads:
The Employer shall provide adequate,
secure and accessible space within
the Morrissey Boulevard plan for the
conduct of union business.

The contractual agreement for office space made available
to the Union by the Company was agreed to in the negotiations for
the 1982-1984 contract, and appeared for the first time in that
contract.

The contract language then was the same as now, except

that it did not include the words "secure and accessible."

But

the critical language "for the conduct of union business" was in
the 1982-1984 contract, and remained unchanged

thereafter.

Obviously, the issue is whether the Bank of Boston services to be made available to the Union members at and through the
office provided the Union by the Company is "the conduct of Union
business" within the meaning of the foregoing contract provision.
The Company argues that "union business" is defined and
limited to a union's legal and representational authority, namely
its function as the collective bargaining agent in dealing for its
members with the Company on wages, hours and working conditions,
and in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement.
The banking services offered and contemplated by the Bank of Boston
albeit at and through the Union's office does not fall within the
traditional and legal definition of union business, and hence,
asserts the Company, there is no contract violation if the Company
bars its implementation.

o

The Union contends that "union business" is not limited or
constrained by narrow technical definitions, but rather should be
interpreted based on the many services that unions offer to their
members that are recognized as programs consistent with a union's
objective to improve the personal lives of its members and which
may go beyond the legal bounds of "wages, hours and working conditions."

But because they are lawful and legitimate, and so long

as they are carried out without interference with the Company's
production and work schedule, they are a bona fide "union business
with the modern intent and purpose of the contract.
More specifically, the Union asserts that there has been
a past practice of such activities carried on at and from the Unior
office; that the Company has been aware of those activities, which
concededly are not within the legal ambit of "wages, hours and
working conditions;" the Bank of Boston presence is just another
such activity and cannot now be prohibited by the Company.
There is no probative evidence that at the time Article X
paragraph 9 was first negotiated, in the 1982-1984 contract, the
phrase "union business" was mutually intended to mean anything
other than its legal, labor law definition.

In the absence of any

such specific evidence of a different meaning, the language must
be accorded its traditional and well understood meaning, especially when it is part of a labor contract.

That meaning, in labor

law, pertains to the "business of the union" on behalf of its
members, over wages, hours and working

conditions.

As the contract language "union business" has not been
changed in the successor and current contracts, that meaning cannot be enlarged or changed to encompass the bank services in dispute in this case, unless long standing past practice, known to

-4or acquiesced in by the Company, shows by specific examples beyond 'the traditional meaning, of an expanded or changed meaning
in the language.
It is undisputed that there has been no negotiated change
in the critical language.

Nor do I find a change by past practice

The examples of other or additional uses of the office, recited
and relied on by the Union, do not rise to the level of a binding
practice within the requisite definition.
What the Union has pointed to are ad hoc activities made
available directly by the Union to its members.

Those activities

were so low keyed or de minimus as to not be known to the Company
or, because of their casual de minimus nature were not objected
to by the Company.

Examples of these activities were personal

counseling of members by a prior union president, hand-craft sales
making available discount theatre, restaurant and vacation tickets
and certain other sporadic non-BGEA activities.
These are not the kind of open, continuing and regular
activities that make up a past practice.

None of them are analo-

gous to the bank service in dispute here.

Unlike the example cite I,

the Bank of Boston, not the Union or its officials would be offering the services.

Employees of the Bank, not the Union would be

coming on to the Company's premises to offer and transact the
services.

And most significantly, the Union has disclaimed re-

sponsibility for the transactions involved.

To my mind, the latte

disclaimer, divorces the banking activities from any definition
of "union business," including the liberal definition advanced by
the Union in this case.

Moreover a regular set of banking ser-

vices is much more institutionalized, more visible and more
commerical if not controvertial, than any of the activities cited
by the Union as making up a past practice.

In short, I find
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material and determinative differences between what went on before
and the proposed banking services of the Bank of Boston.
The hypothetical examples raised by the Union that are
consistent with a Union's modern interests and responsibilities,
but not necessarily within its legal authority as the bargaining
agent, are just that - hypothetical and speculative.

Interviews

by counsel of employees with workers compensation claims, for
example, or other types of personal and professional counseling
which the Union might make available to its members through specialists, are simply not part of this case.
situations

When and if such

(and others of a similar type) arise, they will have

to be judged then if the Company prohibits the use of the office
for such purposes.

Indeed, I do not agree with some of the Com-

pany answers to the hypothetical situations posed during the hearing, but those possibilities are not before me, and are not of
precedential use in deciding the question at hand.
Finally, I find of significance the ruling of the office
of appeals of the NLRB in response to the Union's charge that the
Company violated the Act by refusing to provide information on
vendors and third parties it permitted on the premises to provide
services to employees.

In upholding the refusal to issue a com-

plaint the Board's Office of Appeals said,
"The provision of personal loans does not
relate to terms of employment."
That ruling means to me, that what the Union proposed the
Bank of Boston do is not only legally not related to the Union's
representational authority generally, but currently (i.e. as of
now)

is not so related.

Therefore, as I believe the Board looked

at the contract language and practices thereunder, and had before
it the facts if not the substance of the dispute that is the subje
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of this arbitration, I interpret its ruling under the Act, to be
currently applicable to the contract as well.
For the foregoing reasons, and despite my personal

com-

mendation to the Union for its imaginative efforts to provide
important and more convenient bank services to its members, I
must find that the contract language "union business" is confined
to the Union's legal authority to deal with the Company on !'w§ges,
hours and working conditions" for the employees it represents.
And that does not include the services to be offered by the Bank
of Boston,
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer has not violated the contract
by prohibiting the periodic presence of
Bank of Boston representatives in the Boston
Globe Employees Association office space
provided by the Employer at the Employer's
Morrissey Boulevard plant.

DATED: June 26, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Greenburgh #11 Federation of
Teachers, Local 1532, AFT AFL-CIO
and
Board of Education, Greenburgh
#11 U.F.S.D.
The above-named Federation of Teachers, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Board of Education, hereinafter referred to as the "Board" have submitted to me for decision, a
dispute involving the grievances of Mary McCarron and Janet Pagano,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievants."
The Union and Board were unable to agree upon a stipulated
issue.

Based on the record before me I deem the issue to be:
Did the Board violate Article V Section B
I.e. of the collective bargaining agreement dated February 1, 1986 to January 31,
1988 covering Teachers, and Article VIII
Section F of the collective bargaining
agreement dated February 1, 1986 to January
31, 1988, covering Teacher Aides, with regard to the grievances of Mary McCarron and
Janet Pagano?
The Union stipulated that this case "does not involve a

pay remedy."
Ms. McCarron is a Teacher and Ms. Pagano is a Teacher
Aide .
A hearing was held on October 3, 1988 at which time the
grievants and representatives of the Union and Board appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record of

the proceedings was taken.
The two aforementioned contract provisions read the same,
as follows:

-2Members of the bargaining unit who are deemed to
be disabled as the result of a work related incident by the Workers' Compensation Board shall
incur no loss of sick leave and shall be paid at
their regular rate of pay during the period of
such work related disability. Any sick leave
used during an absence which is later determined
by the Workers' Compensation Board to be work related shall be credited back to the teacher aide's
accumulated sick leave. A member of the bargaining unit who is, due to the lack of sick leave,
placed on leave without pay for a disability that
is later determined by the Workers' Compensation
Board to be work related shall be paid at his/her
regular rate of pay for the period that he/she was
on leave without pay. If the District does not
contest the work related nature of an absence, the
member shall continue to receive his/her salary
during such absence to the extent that it remains
a work related absence. Any benefits under the
District's Worker's Compensation insurance policy
other than a scheduled award shall be payable to
the District for any period that the member of the
bargaining unit is on a Workers' Compensation leave
to the extent that such benefits constitute payment
of wages.
As I see it, the critical and determinative language of
the foregoing clause is:
"If the District does not contest the work related nature of an absence, the member shall
continue to receive his/her salary during such
absence to the extent that it remains a work
related absence."
Obviously, to properly implement this sentence, if an
employee is not to receive salary during the absence the Board
must decide at the time of the absence to contest the work related
nature of the injury and the absence resulting therefrom. There
would be no other way or basis to deprive an employee of salary
during the absence involved.
Both grievants were absent from work due to what they
claimed were work-related injuries.
sation claims.

Both filed Workers' Compen-

Their claims were submitted to the State Insurance

Fund and the Workers' Compensation Board.
During the period of their absences the Board did not pay
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them their salaries, but decided instead to await the determinations of the State Insurance Fund and the Workers' Compensation
Board as to whether the injuries were

work-related and the claims

properly covered by Workers' Compensation.
I find the determinative language of the two contracts to
be clear.
the

If the Board does not contest the claim, it must pay

affected employee his or her salary during the period of the

absence.

And conversely, only if the Board contests the claim

may it withhold payment of salary during the period of the absence
until the appropriate administrative agency or agencies make
substantive determinations.
I have previously held that for these alternative actions
to be implemented, the Board must decide whether to contest or
not to contest a claim at the time the absence takes place.
As the Board did not pay the grievants their salaries
during the relevant periods of absences the issue narrows to
whether the Board contested their claims.
I find the Board did not.
and admitted.

What the Board did is clear

It took no position regarding the validity of the

claims, but left it to the State Fund and Compensation Board.

It

did not act to oppose the claims and it did not accept the claims.
Rather it "stood mute," awaiting the outcome of the investigations
by the State Fund and Compensation Board.

What it did however,

was not to pay the grievants their salaries.
I fail to see how the Board's position of neither opposing
or accepting the claims, constitutes "contest (ing)" the claim withjin the meaning of the contract provisions.
The dictionary definitions of '"contest"

are "challenge,"

"dispute," "contention," "1itigation." The Board did none of these.
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Manifestly to "contest" requires some action in opposition
some partisan position challenging or disupting the claim; or some
contention doubting the validity of the claim.

A passive or

neutral stance, which neither opposes nor approves the claim does
not meet the test of contesting the claim, and cannot therefore
be a basis to deny the payment of salary during the absence involved .
At the hearing it became clear that the Board did in fact
and at one time doubt the bona fides of the grievants' claims.

In

both instances the Board or its representatives thought that the
injuries may have been related to earlier injuries or other circumstances, and not to the job-related circumstance alleged.

But

the Board took no official action in support or furtherance of
such beliefs.

It did not oppose or question

the claims either

before the State Insurance Fund or the Workers' Compensation
Board.

Indeed, it did not even notify the grievant or the Union

that it doubted or questioned the validity or bona fides of the
claims.

In short, the Board may have harbored doubts, but it took

no steps to "contest" the claims based on those doubts, as required by the contract to justify non-payment of salary during
the absences.

Accordingly the Board erred in not paying salaries

to the grievants during their absences.
By the time of the hearing, or at least by now, the grievants have been paid their salaries for the periods of their absences based on the later decisions of the Insurance Fund and
Compensation Board that their injuries were work related and that
they were entitled to some Workers' Compensation awards.
But if not, the Board shall make the grievants whole for
salary denied or withheld.
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The Undersigned, having been duly sworn, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The Board violated article V Section B
l.c and Article VIII Section F of the
Teacher and Teacher Aide collective bargaining agreements, with regard to the
grievances of Mary McCarron and Janet
Pagano. The two named grievants should
have been paid their salaries during their
job-related injury absences. If by this
time they have not been paid those salaries,
they shall be so paid forthwith.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 3, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Greenburgh Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1939 0177

and
Greenburgh Central School
District No. 7 (Board of Education)

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Board of Education violate the contract between it and the Greenburgh Federation of Teachers, Clause H by reassigning
Elaine Brownstein, without her consent, from
kindergarten to first grade at Juniper Hill
School for the 1988-1989 school year, when
two Juniper Hill School kindergarten teachers with less seniority than Mrs. Brownstein
remained as teachers in kindergarten? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 5, 1989 at which time Mrs.
Brownstein and representatives of the above-named Association
and School District appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
Subsequent to the hearing, and pursuant to agreed upon
arrangements, the Association filed a memorandum in reply to
the "Memorandum of Law" submitted by the District at the hearing
Clause H, Section 2 is the relevant contract provision.
It reads:
Where a change in enrollment or limitation
of physical facilities requires the reduction in the number or change in assignment
of teachers in a particular building, at a
particular grade level or in a particular
department, in accordance with established
Board policy respecting class size, building
utilization, curriculum or educational policy or philosophy, transfers shall be made
considering the following factors:

-2[1] volunteers
[2] noncertified teachers
[3] teachers with the least number of
years in the District
[4] teachers with the least number of
years in the building or in the
department
[5] teachers with the least number of
years of total teaching experience
[6] teachers with the least amount of
accredited hours beyond the Bachelor's
level.
The position of the Association is that the District is
limited in its reasons for an involuntary reassignment of a
teacher to the six factors enumerated in the foregoing clause;
that the factors must be considered in the order listed, from
#1 to #6; that factors #1 and #2 were not factually applicable
to the instant case; and that

Mrs. Brownstein's reassignment

violated factor #3 because, as is stipulated in the issue, there
were two kindergarten teachers with less seniority than Brownstein
and one of them should have been transferred instead of Brownstein
The District's position is that Clause H Section 2 is not
exclusive and does not set forth all the relevant factors or considerations which the District may employ in deciding on an involuntary reassignment.

It asserts that the words "transfers

shall be made considering the following factors" (emphasis added)
means that only cons iderat ion need be given to the enumerated
factors, but that so long as

good faith consideration is given

to those factors, the District may use and rely on other reasons
to make and justify the reassignment; that the negotiation history
of bargaining supports this view as does past practice; that here,
Brownstein was selected because she was "best qualified" for the
reassignment to the first grade; that though the other two junior
kindergarten teachers were certified to teach first grade they were
still probationary, had been previously transferred and the District
thought it would be disruptive to transfer them again; and that at
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the time of the grievance, the state of the education law prohibited the district from bargaining away a school superintendent's
unrestricted right to make transfers and reassignments and that
that law is applicable to the arbitrator's authority in this case
(even though the law was later changed).
I find that Clause H Section 2 is sufficiently clear to
make any past practice to the contrary immaterial.

I also find

that the evidence and testimony on its bargaining history does not
establish the non-exclusive or advisory nature as asserted by
the District.

Indeed, I am convinced that during the negotiations

and with the assistance of a mediator, the clause evolved with
sufficient mandatory and exclusive intent to warrant its interpretation and enforcement as written.

It should be noted that the

mandatory word "shall" (meaning "must") is included in the phrase
"transfers shall be made considering the following factors"
(emphasis added).

So, I am not persuaded, nor does the record

of bargaining show, that the emphasis was more on the word "considering" than on the word "shall."

A logical, and I believe

proper interpretation is that the word "shall" limits the District
to the six factors listed, and that the word "considering" means
that the factors are to be considered in descending order.
Also, and persuasive to me, is the obvious fact that if
the Clause says that certain factors are to be considered, it
means that other factors are not to be considered.

A contrary

conclusion would make Clause H Section 2 essentially meaningless
or at least highly ineffectual.

I do not believe that it was

negotiated for a meaningless or ineffectual

purpose.

In the instant case the District considered other factors
as well as the six listed.

It considered, and indeed was persuaded

-4by the relative abilities of Brownstein and the two junior teachers
And it considered and apparently was persuaded by the probationary
status of the other two and by the fact that they had been previously and recently transferred.

And there is some evidence that

the District considered "the best interests of the District and
the

pupils. "
There is no doubt that these additional factors are prob-

ably

meritorious, standing alone and apart from the contract.

But they are not among the factors listed in Clause H Section 2.
These "external" factors were certainly within the knowledge or
contemplation of the parties when the Clause was negotiated.

Had

it been intended that they could be considered, they would and
should have been included in the listing.

As I have found the

six factors to be exclusive, these "external" factors may not now
be included or implied.
With regard to the District's legal argument regarding
the arbitrator's authority at the time this grievance arose to
procedural and not substantive aspects of transfers or reassignments, I decline to take arbitral

jurisdiction.

I have long held

that unless both sides voluntarily give me the authority to interpret and apply "external law" to a contract dispute, I lack the
"jurisdictional competence or authority" to do so.

In this case

the parties have not given me that authority jointly.
advances the external law and the Association
its consideration by the arbitrator.

The District

inter alia opposes

The impact of that law is

therefore left to the forums with jurisdiction and authority, with
the rights of the parties expressly reserved in that respect.

My

authority stems from and is confined to the contract, and my decision is based on the contract.

-5The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Board of Education violated the contract
between it and the Greenburgh Federation of
Teachers, Clause H, by reassigning Elaine
Brownstein without her consent, from kindergarten to first grade at Juniper Hill School
for the 1988-1989 school year, when two
Juniper Hill School kindergarten teachers with
less seniority than Mrs. Brownstein remained
as teachers in kindergarten.
The Board of Education is directed to return
Mrs. Brownstein to her kindergarten position
at the Juniper Hill School beginning the next
school year.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 6, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153 O.P.E.I.U.

OPINION

and

and
AWARD

International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union

The stipulated issue is:
Was the denial of the bid of Lydia
Kakavas just? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 23, 1989 at which time
Ms. Kakavas, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of Local 153, hereinafter referred to as the "Union"
and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, hereinafter
referred to as the "Employer," appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievant, a Grade 5 Clerk Typist in the Employer's
Health Center bid for the position of Secretary to the Medical
Director, classified as Grade 8.

The Employer denied her bid for

the then vacancy in the Secretary job on the grounds that she
lacked the "fitness and ability" required by Article VI of the
contract.

The pertinent part of that provision reads:
"....Vacancies and promotions shall be
filled from among staff members on the
basis of fitness and ability...."

I find the Employer's denial of the grievant - s bid to be
violative of the letter, spirit and purpose of the contract in at
least three respects.
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First, instead of according the grievant credit for her
twenty-eight years of seniority, it held that extensive seniority against her in deciding she lacked the fitness or ability for
the promotion.

A principal reason for denying the bid, is the

Employer's position that because of the grievant's long service at
the Health Center, she had developed familiarity and personal relationships with the staff which would make it difficult for her
to act independently and perhaps at time adversarily in dealing
with physicians and the staff and in maintaining
tiality" of records

the "confiden-

as the representative of the Medical Director

There is no evidence of any such disability in this record
It is only the Employer's view, unsupported by any probat ive
examples of inability to take on the new role and duties of Secretary to the Director or breaches of loyalty or confidentiality.
Indeed, by hiring a person from the outside for the job, the
Employer disregarded, without substantive reasons or rationale,
the specific thrust and preferential interest of Article VI, that
"...Vacancies ..shall be filled from
among staff members ..."(emphasis added).
With twenty eight years seniority and with no serious dispute over her technical skills and work record, I find it unjust,
if not arbitrary to deny the grievant's bid because she had too
much experience and seniority as a staff member of the Health
Center.

Especially so, when the reasons advanced by the Employer

are purely speculative, unsupported by examples of conflicts of
identity or lack of loyalty or indiscretion.
Second, the bid was denied because the vacancy, as the
job posting states, required "executive secretary experience."
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Again, I cannot accept that qualification as a total bar to advancement of staff members, as would be the case if the Employer's
position prevailed.

Based on the record, the only job in the

bargaining unit that calls for "executive secretarial experience"
is this job - Secretary to the Medical Director.

(The secretary

to the Director of the Member Assistance Program, is in the
Director's words only "close to the level of executive secretary).
I do not quarrel with that job duty.

I think it is appropriate

for the Medical Director's Secretary.

Nor do I quarrel with the

Employer's right to determine the job duties of all the jobs in
the

bargaining unit.

total forecoosure

What I quarrel with is the result - the

of eligibility within the bargaining unit for

promotion to this secretarial position.

For, as there are no other

jobs in the unit which require or include "executive secretary" experience or duties, no staff member while employed at the Health
Center can acquire that experience.

And hence, all staff members

are effectively and constructively ineligible and unfit for this
promotion.

I conclude that that flies in the face of the "priority"

for staff members set forth in Article VI.

Also, a further look

at the contract persuades me that the parties did not intend to
require a successful bidder to have all the qualifications, or
be capable of taking on all the duties of the promotion immediately
upon being advanced.

Section 5 of Article VI provides for a

"training period" for employees promoted.

It also provides for

cancellation of the promotion "if the employee's services are
unsatisfactory."

While this provision provides for wage increases

after satisfactory completion of a training period, it also means,
to me, that employees promoted are accorded a period of time (i.e.
three months) for on-the-job experience, if not specific training,
to demonstrate fitness and ability, and to acquire skills which
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the employee has the ability to learn.
in its application.

Section 5 is not limited

Hence it applies to all promotions within

the bargaining unit, and I see no reason why it should not apply
to the grievant's bid for promotion to the bargaining unit job of
Secretary to the Medical Director.

Therefore the Employer's

denial of the bid because the grievant admittedly lacked

"exec-

utive secretary experience" is also inconsistent with the letter
and intent of the contract to accord a promotee up to three months
to perform all duties satisfactorily especially here in view of
the grievant's good work record as a clerk-typist.

Given that

chance, I believe the grievant would have succeeded.

But in any

event, she was contractually entitled to the chance on that basis.
Third, the bid was denied because the Employer determined
that the job of Secretary to the Medical Director was "particularly
stressful" and that it might impair the grievant's health because
she suffers from high blood pressure.
There is no medical evidence or testimony whatsoever in
support of this.

There is no evidence that the grievant's high

blood pressure is not controlled by medication.

There is no evi-

dence of a proximate connection between a "stressful" job and
elevated blood pressure.

There is no evidence that the grievant's

doctor or any physician would bar the promotion on medical grounds.
In short, there is no evidence in support of the Employer's conclusion that the grievant's purported high blood pressure made her
unfit for the promotion.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The
was
job
and

denial of the bid of Lydia Kakavas
not just. She shall be given the
of Secretary to the Medical Director
made whole for the differential in pay,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 27, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °'"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan Distributors

The stipulated issue is:
Was there good and sufficient cause for
the discharge of Julio Barreiro? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 4, 1989 at which time Mr.
Barreiro, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
There is no question that the grievant's record of
absenteeism and lateness was excessive, and that prior to his
discharge for that continued unsatisfactory record, he had been
warned and suspended in accordance with the traditional rule of
progressive discipline.
The only issues are whether he should be excused from
that record because of his claim that it was due to his family
responsibilities while his wife was pregnant and confined to
her bed to avoid a second miscarriage, and to the need to stay
home at times to care for the child after it was born while his
wife recovered from a cesarian delivery and thereafter when she
had to return to work to keep her job when they could not afford
child care.
If there is any principle well settled in labor

relations
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and arbitral law, it is that an employer need not tolerate excessive and chronic absenteeism or lateness even if its cause
is beyond the employee's fault and control.

In the operation

and furtherance of its business, the employer is entitled to
rely on and require regular and prompt attendance.

That prin-

ciple alone is enough to deny that part of the grievance founded
on those explanations.
Moreover, it is difficult to consider those explanations
when the grievant's record shows innumerable absences and latenesses for which he did not call in or otherwise timely notify
the Company so that it could plan or try to plan coverage of
his work assignment.

That reveals an indifference and irrespon-

sibility which casts doubt on the bona fides of his excuses and
his efforts to reconcile those problems with his employment responsibilities.

Though I believe as a low income couple they did

have problems with child care and the handling of family duties,
the grievant's frequent absences on Fridays and Mondays and his
marginal attendance record even before his wife's pregnancy also
cast doubt on the overall credibility of his excuses and suggest
other reasons as well for that unsatisfactory attendance record.
There is no evidence to rebut these logical and reasonable inferences, and there is no evidence that his attendance problems are
not chronic and would improve if he was retained in his job.
The grievant also claims that his absences in the later
weeks were in fact vacation days pursuant to an agreement and
arrangement he had with the Company's distribution manager.
an unusual arrangement

Such

(when by practice employees take vacation

during a particular consecutive period of time) requires clear
proof, with the burden on the grievant and the Union to establish
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that proof.
The Company's distribution manager denies he made any
such arrangement with the grievant.

The Union does not assert

that any such arrangement was made.

Only the grievant claims

its existence.

His bare claim and testimony are not enough to

meet the burden of

proof.

Significantly, despite his claim of

and reliance on the alleged arrangement, neither he nor the
Union grieved his final warning of September 9, 1988.

It seems

to me that if the absences, particularly those in August, which
led to the final warning, were actually an agreed to use of vacation time, the grievant and/or the Union would have vigorously
protested and grieved the September 9 final warning as unjust
and based on the wrong facts.
the final warning

The failure to protest or grieve

is strong evidence that no such bilateral agree-

ment was reached to allow the grievant to take vacation time in
days .
The Undersigned, duly designated Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the abovenamed parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was good and sufficient cause for
the discharge of Julio Barreiro.

DATED: April 11, 1989
STATE OF New York )
.
COUNTY OF New York ) S b - -

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

